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The Dollar Rules!

 

By Dr. John Roughan

Our politicians are currently bowing down to the almighty dollar as they have never done in the past. Poison from Taiwan is coming to the Solomons because the nation desperately needs money. Disease, pollution, dirty and deadly things are coming to our country because we need the almighty dollar. We willingly import death to our own people to get our hands on the almighty dollar.

Last week our elected leaders, Cabinet members of Solomon Islands government, sworn to up hold the nation's constitution, to defend the country, are determined to import rubbish which will kill our people, make them sick all because we need money. When the cabinet minister was reminded that the technical papers written by experts show that what we would get is poison, death and sickness, the response was "Leave the studies first time! We'll import the toxic waste and worry about the future behind!"

The nation's highest officials have now given a completely new meaning to the word development. It's acceptable into their terms to poison land, contaminate water, destroy reef and destroy life so long as one promises the villagers who will be destroyed schools, clinics, roads and jobs behind. The nation, through its misguided thinking to import toxic waste, has become the laughing stock of the Pacific and a warning flag has been raised for donor friends and reduce investor confidence.

No longer do we hear the excuse that this Taiwanese waste is 'humus'--enriching top soil, good for logged out areas. No it's now admitted that the stuff that a Taiwanese company (which has really been out of business since February) will be sending is seriously toxic and quite able to bring sickness to the ground, the waters and the reefs, and disease to our people for many years to come. The real reason for the cabinet decision is clear. The government is so bankrupt, morally, financially and culturally, that it will make any kind of a deal, so long as the nation would get money for it. I notice, however, that the toxic waste will be dumped in someone else's backyard far away from the 'important' people.

Notice, the toxic waste is going to be dumped on Makira's Weather Coast, far enough away from those who are making this bleak decision that it won't hurt them or their families. If these cabinet ministers are so concerned with money, then let the poisonous waste be dumped in their own village, close to their own families and with their own wontoks first. Then with time to study what happens over many years, the rest of the Solomons can make a decision to import the waste or not.

One thing is sure. Toxic wastes worldwide will not go away soon--the whole world has been trying to get rid of its toxic wastes for years--so even if our country has to wait five to ten years, the poisonous waste will still be waiting for us to import. Why? Because if the waste wasn't so bad for human beings why doesn't Taiwan keep it in their own backyard rather than paying big dollars to ship the stuff 6,000 miles to another country and have that country, Solomon Islands in this case, be paid to have it dumped here. Why aren't other countries in the Pacific--Narau, Vanuatu, PNG--lining up to accept this rubbish if it was such a good deal. These same countries also need to build up their destroyed forests. Do they know something we are refusing to accept because we are in bankrupt mode?

Dr. Morgan Wairiu, the Permanent Secretary for the Ministry of Agriculture, is the only one that comes out of this whole mess still smelling like a rose. All the others, especially the ministers, smell awful. He has fought the cabinet's decision, quietly at first which is the way of the Public Servant, and then when his political masters stopped up their ears, he went public. Unfortunately, he won't be long with us. The present government will find it hard to keep an outspoken, knowledgeable and straight speaker in the same boat as those who are secretive, uncaring and devious. Good on you, Morgan and may there be many more Public Servants of the same calibre. Perhaps then the Solomons will get back its dignity.

THE TRUTH IS CRITICAL TO LASTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS

 

By Frank Short, CBE

The U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, released by the Bureau of Democracy, and Human Rights, and Labor are important internationally circulated documents that expose injustices and help in establishing democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights in countries throughout the world.

Valuing such annual reports highly for their accuracy, I was shocked when reading the U.S. State Department Country Report on the Solomon Islands dated March 4, 2002, (which was included in the Pacific Islands Report on March 27, 2002), [SEE: U.S. Department of State: Solomon Islands: Human Rights Report at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eap/8376.htm] by a reference which read, "In 1998 and 1999, when the Police were battling the Guadalcanese militants, police officers were involved in extrajudicial killings and unwarranted use of lethal force against civilians." I believe this statement needs to be clarified for not only is it untrue, but it contradicts the information published in the previous U.S. Department of State Country Report on the Solomon Islands, dated February 26, 1999, when it was stated "there were no reports of political or extrajudicial killings" (in1998). At a time when accurate reporting is vital to the efforts to promote healing and reconciliation in the Solomons, I therefore consider the latest U.S. report should be corrected.

I was the Commissioner of Police in the Solomon Islands when the so-called ethnic troubles first began in September 1998 and I remained in charge of the Police until July 1999, when I left after declining another two -year contract. I have first hand knowledge of the events from September 1998 until my departure and I believe it is timely and important to set the record straight.

During the early hours of December 9, 1998, when I was in New Zealand attending a meeting, a party of men with their faces partially covered, mounted a commando style raid on the remote Yandina Police Station after arriving in canoes during darkness. They attacked and held the unsuspecting lone Sergeant captive while they forced open the armory and stole several rifles and ammunition. The police officer, although injured and shaken during the incident, later managed to contact his local headquarters and report the matter. The raiders had escaped, however, by the time a police party could be mustered and both the men and the stolen firearms were not found in the following days despite an intensive search.

It was some three weeks later, on December 30, 1998, when I received a report from one of my senior officers that five armed men, some dressed in military style uniform, had allegedly stolen a power boat from the Tambea Beach Resort and, after beaching the craft on Bungana Island following a suspected mechanical failure, they had been challenged by members of a police party from the Central Islands Police Headquarters at Tulagi, who had gone to the scene following a tip-off. Shots were reported to have been fired at the policemen after they had identified themselves and a Constable was hit in the face. Further shots had then occurred and one of the men, later identified as Ishmael Panda, fell from a tree where he had concealed himself. He was found to have suffered a chest wound and died soon afterwards. Another of the men, identified as Harold Keke, received a flesh wound to his head and was given first aid by the policemen at the scene. While receiving this treatment, he allegedly said to the police officer aiding him that he was "sorry" and claimed "Alebua told us to do this."

The deceased, Keke and the other arrested persons, including Joseph Sangu, were conveyed to Honiara and held in custody while the body of Ishmael Panda was removed to the hospital mortuary. Keke was later admitted to the hospital for a short while for treatment but kept under constant police guard. The firearms recovered from the prisoners captured on Bungana Island were found to include those allegedly stolen from the Yandina Police Station. During his time in custody, Joseph Sangu actually wrote a note, which he gave to a prison officer. In the note, Sangu called on those involved in the "struggle" to stop their activities as it (the "struggle") was over. I seem to recall that the Solomon Islands Broadcasting Station may have broadcast the contents of the note at Sangu's request.

The shooting of Ishmael Panda was initially communicated to me as having occurred during an exchange of fire on the beach near the abandoned power boat and my concern was doubly aroused when I discovered that he had been shot while concealed in a tree. I ordered an immediate inquiry and instructed Senior Superintendent Hosking, a British officer with previous military and firearms experience, to undertake the work. He quickly reported back to me and, based on his initial findings, I requested, through the Government, the assistance of the New Zealand Police to further the investigations.

Two senior New Zealand Police officers very soon afterwards began a skilled and detailed inquiry into Ishmael Panda's death, aided by forensic work conducted by the Australian Federal Police. Their combined investigations led to the early arrest of a police officer that I had placed under suspension for misconduct some weeks before. This Constable had managed to join the police party when leaving Tulagi for Bungana Island, despite having been seen by his Commander and who knew he was officially suspended from all police duties. The Constable was subsequently charged with the murder of Panda and later convicted and sentenced. His Commander was also severely disciplined by myself. The unlawful killing by the policeman was the only death of a civilian attributed to the police in 1998 and the only case in which a police officer has been investigated, to the best of my knowledge, for human rights abuses since the tragic events unfolded in the Solomon Islands until the present time.

My handling of the Bungana Inquiry was criticized in the Solomons at the time and I think the general feeling was that I would not allow an independent and thorough investigation. My decision to call in the New Zealand and Australian Police was not influenced by such criticism for I was determined that there would be transparency and the final report given to me by the investigators vindicated my actions by stating that all the documents seen by the detectives in an endeavor to assimilate and understand aspects of Royal Solomon Islands Police Policy, Practice and Procedures, "clearly and succinctly confirms the Commissioner's determination to ensure the use of minimum force when dealing with incidents." Referring to my Policy Outline, the final report read, "The Commissioner has a particular vision and commitment to ensuring accountability in the Police Service, equally the Commissioner espouses the principle of fairness and equity of a commitment to human rights."

The prisoners detained after their arrest on Bungana Island were facing serious charges, including attempted murder and two counts of armed robbery, but despite a plea by the Police Prosecutor, the accused, including Keke and Sangu, were released by the Chief Magistrate on bail put up by Premier Alebua, the leader of Guadalcanal Province and by a Catholic priest. The accused immediately absconded to the remote areas of the Weathercoast and intensified the campaign. Repeated efforts to re-capture the escapees failed due to the difficulty in reaching the locations where they had been reported, but also by a lack of transport, poor equipment and communications and, it was suspected, by the deliberate leaking of police operational information and intelligence.

Responding to the many serious hit and run incidents on Guadalcanal following the release of the prisoners, the police patrols often came on the scene too late because of the time it took to reach their destination, but also because the policemen found themselves in territory where their vehicles were ambushed and exposed to armed attack. To make matters worse the police investigators were handicapped by a reluctance by witnesses to give information for fear of reprisals and by intimidation.

After the Bungana incident, I issued further orders to ensure compliance with international norms on the use of firearms was being observed, but I had previously recorded: "The members of the Solomon Islands Police should be able to carry out their duties without having to resort to force. Conflict resolution skills must be learned for resolving all types of conflicts. We must be committed to the use of minimum force when dealing with incidents. The members of the service must, therefore, have access to training and equipment, which obviate the need for force to resolve problems. Any laws and police regulations, which act contrary to the use of minimum force, should be amended to bring them in line with international standards. Although the members of the police service will still need to be issued with adequate equipment to protect them in dangerous situations, they must only be issued with weapons which are appropriate to the situation they are likely to encounter."

Police officers were therefore under strict orders to comply with my standing orders on the use of firearms and arms could only to be issued and carried in special circumstances. When police patrols were regularly being ambushed and their unprotected vehicles and unprotected personnel came under armed attack, I gave permission for some firearms to be carried, but concealed. As the intensity of armed attacks on the Malaitan community increased so did the number of incidents in which the police found themselves the target of roadside shootings from persons hiding in the surrounding thick bush. In some instances the police returned the fire in order to protect themselves but no reports of fatalities were reported as a result of police action after the Bungana incident prior to my leaving the Solomons.

One article in the Solomon Star contributed by a member of the public and published in the edition of the paper dated July 28 1999 commented: "Throughout the national ordeal the only incident that the police can perhaps be faulted for was the one killing that took place on Bungana Island during the early stages of the national crisis. Other than that, in all the confrontations that they have had with members of the GRA and other law-breakers, the police have maintained a gentle and dignified composure avoiding retaliation and focusing exclusively on peace and social stability as their primary responsibility. Undoubtedly, only a police force guided by strong leadership and the true spirit of mutual respect and trust can uphold such a level of professionalism in the face of unprecedented lawlessness."

The unsolicited comment after I had left office lends support to my belief that the police were not involved knowingly in any extrajudicial killing of civilians during my period in charge other than the tragic shooting of Ishmael Panda and for which the culprit was brought to justice and punished. The police, on the other hand, despite having available superior firepower behaved, on the whole, with considerable constraint while risking life and limb to try and protect the innocent victims of the ethnic troubles and investigate the many incidents.

I supported all the Government's efforts to bring about a peace settlement and advised the Prime Minister to seek the assistance of the Commonwealth in an attempt to broker a peaceful outcome to the conflict which had seen the displacement of many Malaitan plantation workers and their families, savage brutality and property damage.

I have been horrified and deeply saddened since leaving the Solomons by the deaths of so many Solomon Islanders and by the mistrust and bitterness that has created enmity between brothers; an enmity that has now developed into lawlessness and where communities in Honiara and other provincial centers such as in Auki and Gizo are threatened by armed persons still holding on to their illegally acquired high- powered firearms.

The present Government's bid to have all stolen weapons surrendered during the first hundred days of office has not been met and the closing date for the surrendering of the illegal weapons and stolen property has been further extended to the end of May this year. This is the third time that an extension of the date to surrender the weapons has been given.

I believe that, ultimately, there must be true reconciliation in the Solomons to resolve what has taken place during the past few years, but I also believe that reconciliation and a lasting peace can only come about when the truth about the formation of the GRA/IFM is known and when the members of the MEF, the Black Sharks and Keke and his supporters disarm. Keke has been reported to allegedly posses a number of high-powered American weapons that he imported illegally and he continues to figure in the news as allegedly being behind several major incidents, including it was claimed an attempted assassination on Alebua. Until Keke fully commits himself to the terms of a peace settlement and hands over all his weapons and ammunition, it is not realistic to think that the MEF or others will do the same.

In a widely circulated paper entitled " 5th June 2000 in Perspective" Andrew Nori the self-styled Malaita Eagle Force spokesperson and prominent Honiara based lawyer claimed, in part of his paper, that in mid July 1998 a meeting was held at Tambea Resort, west Guadalcanal, at which several key Guadalcanal leaders were present and participated. These included Alebua, two Guadalcanal Police officers, Sethuel Kelly and many young men, including Harold Keke and Joseph Sangu. He went on to allege that "a decision was made then to forcefully evict Malaitans from Guadalcanal. Not long afterwards, armed men raided the Yandina Police armory. The GRA was born and the burning, looting, raping, chasing and murdering started."

Mr. Nori is an experienced lawyer, an ex-President of the Solomon Islands Bar, and one who is well aware of the law of defamation. By publishing the names of those he claims were involved in the birth of the GRA, he must have calculated the risks he would face by possible legal proceedings. The information he has released must therefore be considered worthy of investigation by the authorities, particularly in the light of recent calls by the Acting Chief Justice in the Solomons, the Honorable Justice Palmer, who called for such an inquiry.

The urgency for national unity and peace cannot be ignored and neither can the victims of violence be forgotten. Gross violations of human rights have occurred in the Solomons in recent times and this has resulted in a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge. These issues should now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding and the truth, but not for vengeance or further victimization.

The democratically elected Government must be encouraged to promote the building up of a human rights culture in the Solomons and the means must be found, and soon, to complete a picture of the causes, nature and extent of gross violations of human rights which were committed in the period from September 1998 until the present time. Only when this is done will true reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflict and ethnic divisions be achieved.

Different Car but the Same Driver!

 

 

By Dr. John Roughan

A bad, really bad driver of an old and beaten up car can be given a brand new one. But no matter how shiny, up-to-date the new car is, the bad driver remains a poor driver. He doesn't have the necessary skills to drive properly. It's not the fault of the car that he is always in accidents. The poor driver will probably destroy any new car given in a very short time because the trouble is not with the car but with the driver. So to have a safe driving both the car and the driver have to be renewed.

This week members of parliament will be discussing the ins and outs of a State System of government to replace the 1978 Provincial system. People across the nation want finish the Provincial system because it has failed them so miserably. Over the last 24 years the provincial system has been terribly weak. It didn't deliver sound schooling, it has been poor in supplying basic health services, in a word the provincial system has been miserable in delivering basic services to Solomons' people.

Citizens all over the nation are desperate. They know how badly government services have failed them for more than two decades and are hungry to have their modest needs of proper schooling, decent health care and chances of making a few shillings finally fulfilled. The fundamental reason for our three years of Social Unrest is directly linked to the poor servicing of village people for more than twenty years. If a State System of government will do the job, they are all for it. They would even accept a dictatorship if it did the work well. Villagers are not worried about the label. They simply want results.

What villagers and town folk are saying is: government you are suppose to be our servants, not our masters. Please act like servants and stop playing the Big Master. There is nothing really wrong with the Provincial system had politicians, bureaucrats and public servants half done their job. But what they got was a Provincial System that served the Big Masters and lip-serviced people and their needs.

Any new system, on its own, won't guarantee the people will be served. It's like the bad driver mentioned at the beginning. Simply giving a bad driver a new car does not guarantee anything but the same accidents happening over again and over again. The old system--Provincial System--was run by men (mostly men, few women) for men and about men's business. Now these same men--Parliamentarians--are talking about a new system called a State System. Unfortunately those that ruined the old system now tell us the new system is the answer.

But their track record already makes this boast doubtful. For instance, over the last few months, the Kongulai people who own Honiara's water supply, haven't been paid their quarterly payment. Because of that breech, villagers have cut off Honiara's water once again. Honiara's people--mothers with kids, schools, families, health, sanitation, etc. etc.--have to take the brunt of government's inability to do first things first. Kongulai villagers were owed $200,000 which couldn't be found but the week previously more than $8 million was paid out to militants who showed muscle. Such ineptness is bound to continue no matter what the new system is called: Provincial, State, Dictatorship, etc.

It's the human factor that must change, be corrected and brought up to date. Simply changing the label from a Provincial to a State system is not where the action is. Link parliamentarians actual work in office to determine whether the member stays in power. It's called a REFERENDUM! When a parliamentarian reaches the half way point in his four year term, if he isn't measuring up. if he isn't servicing his area, then his people can demand that he face a mid-term election. Linking parliamentarian involvement in a new State System can go a long way to guarantee its success.

A number of states already have this provision in their laws and it has the added beauty of keeping elected members focused on those that put them in office. Too often in the Solomons, once a member is elected then he sits back and coasts for the next four years. Villagers and town people should have a powerful tool to make sure their member acts on their behalf or face an aroused electorate once again. As was said in the very beginning, it is not enough to change the car but the driver too must be up-graded.

Struggling for the Better Life

 

 

By Dr. John Roughan

Solomons' village women have rarely experienced, first hand, what it means to enjoy the Better Life--healthier, more productive and, especially an easier and satisfying one. At times they glimpse it from afar . . . a trip to Honiara to see how the other 'half' live. Village life, on the other hand, is terribly physical. Food production remains laborious, house construction and repair is hard and time consuming, social obligations (church, school, community calls) grow daily and one's limited economic life--small business work, income generating attempts--demands grow more and more acute but there's less and less time, fewer resources or necessary skills available to gain even modest amounts of money.

At independence In 1978 there was great expectation that, now that their own people were finally in charge of the country, the nation's resources would finally fund the basics of the Better Life. The services of education, medical attention, enhancement of people's resource base and new ways to secure modest amounts of money to buy the few luxury items they would allow themselves, e.g. matches, soap, kerosene, colorful clothing, store bought food, etc. etc., would finally be part of their normal life patterns.

During the 'Golden Era' years (1978-1985), commodity prices although slowly in decline remained healthy. Education opportunities in primary grew but secondary entry in percentage terms was seriously eroding. Tertiary education opportunities, however, increased--both at SICHE and overseas universities.

Rural clinic presence although seen as the front line of health defence were less and less able to attract the necessary funds. Central Hospital and Honiara in general absorbed the bulk of medical resources. Other social services--adequate transport, entertainment opportunities, communication links, sports' facilities--were lipserviced for the rural areas but fundamentally centered in Honiara and in minor ways, the provincial capitals.

1986's Cyclone Namu marked the obvious decay of the state's involvement with the bulk of its citizens. In the previous 8 years following independence, the State was finding it more and more difficult to service its people. Politicians, especially parliamentarians, emphasised their own well being at the expense of the village sector. Their game plan was a version of the Trickle Down Theory. If they, the Honiara Elite, did well then that same well being would percolate down to the whole a little bit like Ronald Reagan's famous analogy of the ocean's high tide raising all ships equally--the luxury cruiser, small ship, outboard canoe, paddle canoe, etc.

By 1989, the Solomons had entered onto its 'Leaden Age' rather than all ships rising on the high tide, the village canoe and many of its outboard canoes actually began to sink. In fact, by 1997, the quality of village life especially for women, became harder, less rewarding, poorer and less and less healthy compared to their recent expectations. But the gap between the country's elite, mostly in Honiara, and the impoverished villager grew at an alarming rate.

In 1978, for instance, I was able to count but one millionaire among Solomon Islanders . . . those with assets worth a million dollars: Honiara houses, businesses owned, vehicles driven. By 1998, however, my list of local millionaires had risen dramatically, more than 20 using the 1978 criteria and all without exception had been in government at the highest levels.

The present UN study calls for a 'people-centered' development when the Solomons already has been crying out for years for a 'village centered' one. Of course our present Social Unrest is about the uneven use of people's resources but in the sense that the resource owners thought by allowing the BTO (Big Time Operation) to use their land--SIPL, Gold Ridge, Taiyo, Honiara itself--they were entering into some kind of quid pro quo deal. We, the resource owners, allow you large companies to use our most basic and precious resource--land, water, minerals. etc--but in return we get good crack at the basics of a quality life--adequate health facilities, solid education for our kids, an easier, more rewarding village existence, some amenities and a shot at a future life which is easier, better and certainly healthier than we now live.

What they got, however, was none of the above. Guale people, for instance, experienced lousy schooling yet the nation's best schools sat right on their doorstep . . . Honiara. Too many of their people continued to suffer poor health, malaria was still a bugbear and the basics of adequate health were often lacking yet down the road a bit at SIPL's clinics, Honiara's referral hospital and satellite clinics, all on Guale land, adequate health seemed to be for everyone except them. Is it surprising then that in 1999 they said "Enough is enough!"?

By focusing on the Resource Issue and taking for granted or forgetting what the Guale villager (and other Solomon Islander villagers) were suffering will simply mean in a few years going through the same bloody process once again. My thumbnail yardstick for producing the Better Life is simple: would the development intervention make a woman's life easier, more productive and healthier? If so, carry on. If not, something has gone wrong.

Solomon Islanders to this day still struggle for the Better Life. Opportunists nation-wide during the Social Unrest period jumped at the chance by accessing resources--money--to achieve the Better Life. Political opportunists secured government status to 'legitimately' quarry the natural resources of the nation. Compensation claims often played the same role for achieving the Better Life. Criminal elements some within the police force itself criminalised the state also to get the Better Life denied to them by what we would call the development approach.

This present analysis contradicts little if anything stated in the fine, balanced UN's Common Country Assessment of Solomon Islands. However, it attempts to recast our discussions within the framework of the villager and the village, the core reality of this small country. This analysis focuses on how the UN and our other donors and friends can help us to step forward, to frame our assistance to those who have the greatest needs, have been least helped over the past 24 years and, who, in fact, own an incredible amount of the nation's resource base, up to 91%, which must be used by all for the Better Life for all.

Can Solomon Islands Claim 21st Century?

By Geoffrey Kaka

Solomon Islands enters the 21st century with many of the world's poorest countries. Incomes, assets, and access to essential services are unequally distributed and the rural areas of the Solomons contains a growing share of the world's absolute poor, who have little power to influence the allocation of resources.

Moreover, many development problems have become largely confined to Solomon Islands. They include lagging primary and high school education in rural areas, health services and other institutions.
Many countries have made important economic reforms, improving macroeconomic management, liberalising markets and trade, and widening the space for private sector activity. Where these reforms have been sustained - and underpinned by civil peace - they have raised growth and incomes and reduced poverty. Even as parts of the pacific region are making headlines with ethnic tension and natural disasters, other parts are making headway with rising interest from domestic and foreign businesses and higher investment.

But the response has not been sufficient to overcome years of falling income or to reverse other adverse legacies from the long period of economic decline - including deteriorated Solomon Islands capacity, weakened institutions, and inadequate infrastructure. Major changes are needed if Solomon Islanders - and their children - are to claim the 21st century. With Solomon Islands rapidly growing population, 5 percent annual growth is needed simply to keep the number of poor from rising.

Moreover, Solomon Islands will not be able to sustain rapid growth without investing in its people and in particular tertiary students both at home and abroad. Many of our rural areas lack the health, education, and access to inputs needed to contribute to - and benefit from - high growth. Women are one of Solomon's hidden growth reserves, providing some of the region's labour, but their productivity is hampered by widespread inequality in education and access. Thus gender equality can be a potent force for accelerated poverty reduction.
Solomon Islands thus faces an immense, multifaceted development challenge. But the new century offers a window of opportunity to reverse the marginalisation of Solomon Island's people - and of Solomon Island's governments, relative to donors, in the development agenda. The time has come for political participation to sharply increase, paving the way for more accountable government, and there is greater consensus on the need to move away from the failed models of the past. In my recent contribution on "Good Governance for Solomon Islands" I have tried to emphasise how important it is for Solomon Islands politician to play their part in the development process.
All in all, making these benefits materialise will require a ``business plan'' conceived and owned by Solomon Islanders, and supported by donors through coordinated, longterm partnerships. Solomon Islands culture differs widely, so there is no universal formula for success. But many countries face similar issues, and can draw on positive examples of how to address them.

Improving governance and resolving conflict is perhaps the most basic requirement for faster development. Widespread civil conflicts impose enormous costs, including on neighbouring countries. Contrary to popular belief, Solomon Island's conflicts donot stem from ethnic diversity alone but rather, in a pattern found around the world, conflicts are driven by poverty, underdevelopment, and lack of economic diversification, as well as by political systems that marginalise large parts of the population. But conflicts perpetuate poverty, creating a vicious circle that can be reversed only through special development efforts - including longrun peacebuilding and political reforms. With success in these areas, countries can grow rapidly, and flight capital can return.

Countries that have made the greatest gains in political participation are also those with better economic management. Again, this conforms to a global pattern that suggests multiethnic states can grow as fast as homogeneous ones - if they sustain participatory political systems. Solomon Islands therefore, need to develop political models that facilitate consensus building and include marginalised groups.

Development programs need to be winwin, improving the management and distribution of economic resources and contributing to more effective states. Programs should empower citizens to hold governments accountable, enable governments to respond to new demands, and enforce compliance with the economic and political rules of the game. Development efforts may start to move in this direction, with greater beneficiary involvement in the delivery of services and more emphasis on results. But far more needs to be done to strengthen Solomon Island's institutions - including ensuring that representative institution, such as parliaments, play their proper role in economic and budgetary oversight.

Investing in people is also essential for accelerated poverty reduction in Solomon Islands. Solomon Islanders are caught in a trap of high fertility and mortality, low education (especially of women - less than onequarter of poor rural girls attend primary school), high dependency ratios, and low savings.

While the resources available for education and health are inadequate in Solomon Islands, many need to translate their existing commitment to human development into effective programs for delivering essential services and increasing gender equality. Solomon inherits some of strongest communities in the Pacific, yet services are usually provided through weak, centralised institutions that are seen as remote and ineffective by those they are supposed to serve. Deconcentrated service delivery through local communities, supported by capacity building at local levels and effective governance to ensure transparency and empower recipients, could have a major impact. These could be done with effective regional cooperation and donor support through coordinated long-term partnerships.

Increasing competitiveness and diversifying economies must be a third area of focus if Solomon Islands is to claim this new century. Job creation is slow not because of labor market rigidities (though there are exceptions) but because of the high perceived risks and costs of doing business in Solomon Islands. These need to be lowered by locking in reforms and delivering business services more efficiently - with less corruption, better infrastructure and financial services, and increased access to the information economy. Solomon Islands trails the world on every dimension of these essentials. Lowering these barriers requires new approaches, including more participation by the private sector and by local communities, a more regional approach to overcome the problems posed by their rural communities, and a central government shift to regulating and facilitating services rather than providing them.

Reducing aid dependence and strengthening partnerships will have to be a fourth component of Solomon's development strategy. Concessional assistance is essential if Solomon Islands is to grow rapidly while also increasing consumption to reduce poverty. Excluding private inflows, the savings gap for a typical country is about 17 percent of GDP, and other regions show that private flows cannot be sustained at more than 5 percent of GDP without risk of crisis. But aid, particularly when delivered in a weak institutional environment by large numbers of donors with fragmented projects and requirements, can weaken institutional capacity and undermine accountability.

High debt and debt service add to the problem, deterring private investment and absorbing core budget resources, making governments ever more ``cash poor'' but ``project rich,'' with a development agenda increasingly perceived as being shaped by donors. Lack of selectivity compounds the problem, channelling a lot of aid to countries with poor development policies. And with few exceptions, aid has largely been confined to national boundaries rather than used to stimulate regional and international public goods.

These problems should be widely recognised, and a consensus has emerged that the primary goal of aid should be to reduce poverty. But paradoxically, aid transfers are declining just when many of the problems are being addressed. Solomon Islands enters the new century in the midst of intense debate on aid. New aid relationships are being implemented - relationships that emphasize a holistic, country-driven approach supported by donors on the basis of long-term partnerships, and with greater beneficiary participation and empowerment over the use of resources.

If there is going to be any change in the right direction for the Solomon Islands, I believe there is a long way to go. In a typical poor country like our Solomon Island, aid transfers might equal 10 percent of GDP, yet the poorest fifth of the population disposes of only about 4 percent of GDP. It remains to be seen how well partnerships can resolve the tensions between the objectives of recipients and individual donors, and how far the behaviour of donors will change to facilitate Solomon Islands ownership of its development agenda. It also remains to be seen how far partnerships can extend beyond assistance, to include enhanced opening of world markets to Solomon Islands products and services.


A Pacific First: A Failed State!

 

 

By Dr. John Roughan

Southern Africa has seen many failed states: Sierra Leone, Uganda, Sudan and Congo to name a few. Haiti, an island country off the southern part of the United States, is another example. Argentina in South America, if not yet a failed state, is hurriedly traveling in that same direction. So far in the Pacific we have yet to experience a failed state but Solomon Islands is fast sliding itself that way. It currently shows many of the weaknesses of a failing state.

Lack of security for its citizens is one of the major signs of a failed or failing state. Although we are only two months into a new year, the country's security failures are severe. The recent shoot-up of the police headquarters in Gizo town, a government minister accused of extortion, daily acts of intimidation on business houses and individuals, increasing number of home robberies, hijacked vehicles, murder of police personnel . . . must I continue? Solomon Islands lack of national security for its people guarantees it the dubious distinction of being the Pacific's first failed state.

Another strong sign of a state in severe decline is its inability to secure for its citizens normal schooling, basic medical attention and a functioning economy to help people gain modest amounts of money. The Solomons' inability to serve its people is years old. Our national decline did not start with the 1999-2001 Social Unrest. In fact, government's failure to serve its citizens is one of the most important reasons for our current unrest. Solomon Islands governments have been seriously failing their people since 1989.

SIDT's Report Cards (1992-1997) asked thousands of ordinary village and town persons to grade government's performances in health services, education opportunities, resource assistance and people's chances of gaining money. Over the life of five different governments, Solomons' people failed each government of the day. Not one government had a 60% pass rate. In effect Solomons' people marked their last five governments as failures. Lack of security and poor quality of state services clearly mark the Solomons as a nation on its way out. The Solomons is fast sliding down the failed-nations slope and, unfortunately, has yet to land at the bottom.

What is disheartening, however, is that the Solomons in 1978 faced a great future . . . in a sense we were doomed to success. We started off so well--UK's $35 million golden handshake (at a time when the Solomons' dollar and US were equal), villagers capable of feeding a nation, no war damaged cities to re-build--and here we are ending up the poorest nation in the Pacific. Most of our people live below the poverty line, adult and youth unemployment is at a record high, our economy continues its free fall, our dollar is useless overseas and the people's loss of confidence in the political and social institutions is at a record high.

Such a miserable end for such a blessed country shows up our leaders special talent for destroying the country by lining their own deep greedy pockets first. But the rest of the nation must look at ourselves as well. So many of us thought the country's riches were inexhaustible--round log exports in the 1990s--and we recklessly squandered this wealth. Distrust of the state gradually grew into disrespect of the rule of law, rampant small-time cheating, lying, theft gave the green light for a few greedy 'leaders' to murder the state in the June Coup.

But we must be clear about true meaning of the June 2000 Coup. The destruction of the state was not something totally different from what had been going on for many years during the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The Coup was simply the public acceptance that the State belonged to a political elite who could quarry it for their personal benefit. Their well-thought out and planned destruction of the State on 5 June 2000 was not some new kind of reality. It was simply the continuation of the old politics of an elite stealing the nation's resources for themselves. Unfortunately the 1990s pattern and the true meaning of the Coup continue on to this very day.

Solomon Islanders continue to be fascinated by the rich country it was instead of the poor country it has become. The ordinary citizen must wake up to save the nation from those who are destroying it. It's about action and not more 'betel nut chatter'. The next few years, if we have that many, are critical. We must forget the burst of round-tree fueled growth and the frenzied consumption which it generated. Belt tightening especially among our leaders must be the picture of the future. If not, then Solomon Islands will surely go from sliding down the failed-nation slope to actually being a failed nation.

Honiara's Well Being Starts in the Village!

 

 

By Dr. John Roughan

In President Bush's early days, the United States drew away from the rest of the world. According to President Bush, his country was so strong--unbeatable military force, strongest economy the world had ever seen, an inventive, dynamic and educated people--that it could literally leave the rest of us mere mortals to our own fate. The US would take care of itself in all ways. Then came 11 September 2001. The Twin Towers destruction shook the States to its roots and in turn literally changed the history of humanity forever.
America finally woke up to the fact that it needed the rest of the world as much as the rest of world needed it. Terrorists, they learned, live best in small, poor and unstable nations. No matter how strong the United States had become, terrorists proved more clever by using America's own planes against them. The US's fleet of fighter aircraft, thousands of them, proved useless to stop the terrorists. Slowly America realised that its own well being depended not only on its huge military machine, an overwhelming economy and a dynamic people, it fundamentally needed other people, poor nations--Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia--for its own safety. America painfully learnt a basics truth of history: No country is an island!
Before ever a single bomb was dropped on Afghanistan, before the first soldier landed on its soil, before a shot was fired, the Americans forged new ties with Islamic nations across the globe, calmed the fears of Israel, India and Afghanistan's neighbours and searched for local and international support for the war. And it was highly successful. Within 3 months, from a standing start, it toppled a government 7,000 miles away in the most difficult of terrain and caves, defeating tribes that had beaten back the British and Soviet empires.
Fine you say, a nice piece of history but what does that say about Honiara and the village? What lessons do we learn from the Afghanistan war and apply them to our own case? Bear with me! I see serious lessons which Honiara must learn about its relation to the village and the villager.
Honiara especially its political elite have for years dismissed the village and all it stands for. For starters it treated the rural areas at best as places for hand outs, acts of charity and certainly little to do with village as core to Honiara's well being. Not only is the village and the villager the backbone of the country, it's economy which literally sustains more than 8 out of 10 people nationally, underpins our national cash economy. Honiara's cash economy needs the village economy more than the other way around.
If Honiara's cash economy goes under (and it is well on its way: $1.3 billion debt, bone dry treasury, donor reluctance to help and outright thievery), the village economy will continue, painfully, but it will continue. Recall the Bougainville experience. PNG's military forces blockaded the island for four years. Except for essential medicines and doctors' care--there was no mass starvation, major epidemics, food riots. Bougainvilleans' village economy sustained them through nine years of war.
The Americans thought it would insulate itself from the world's troubles. They were under the illusion if they could take care of themselves, let the rest take care of itself and if it couldn't well that was too bad. Honiara suffers that same soul-sickness.
Life in Honiara, many think, should be richer, healthier, nicer, more stimulating and better and higher than any other place in the country. So the investment dollar, development grant and donation wind up in town. If a fraction of these monies help the villager, that's fine but the main purpose has always been directed primarily towards making Honiara lives easier, better and more enjoyable. And as in the American case, we are paying the price for our lack of vision.
Our home-made Coup in 2000 should have been a national wake up call but unfortunately we continue to slide down the same steep hill. Rather than pulling together to convince donors that we have changed our ways--better medical help in the village we can't even take care of our Central Hospital--it's 'business as usual' . Our youth are bitter and angry, yet our leaders act like spoiled pikininis and live the message that intimidation, gun power and violence--terrorist acts--are acceptable.
The Americans woke up to their blindness. We have yet to do so. Until the village and the villager becomes part of our thinking--functioning schools, decently stocked clinics, useable roads and wharves, a web of local markets--then our own home-grown terrorists will continue working their trade. Honiara's peace and prosperity depend upon a strengthened quality of life for village people.

Blame the Victim!

 

By Dr. John Roughan

A local newspaper, Solomon Star (14 Jan. 2002), correctly focused readers attention on the nation's growing poverty problem. However, the victims of poverty, the vast bulk of our village and town people, are found to be the major reason for causing all this poverty: they are having too many children. Star rightly describes the growing national poverty problem as serious but its editorial points to the wrong reason--"uncontrolled population".

The nation's twenty-four years of suffering through weak political leadership, their poor development policies and even the worse performance of these leaders presents much clearer and convincing reasons why the Solomons now suffers such serious poverty levels. Rather than blaming the victims of poverty, the mothers and fathers of Solomons, it would be much more productive to study the track record of those who have poorly led our country into record poverty levels . . . our political leaders.

Without any doubt growing population pressures contribute to poverty. Our village and town folk realise the connection between the number of children in a family and increased poverty levels. The main reason why married couples produce children, however, is linked to old age. For most parents, children act as an insurance policy for old age. When hard times visit a family or when parents are too old or sick to work the garden, repair their leaf house, or gather food on the reef, etc. having family members--sons and daughters--assures the 'Olos' they can still live out their old age in dignity and respect.

In spite of the weakening cash economy since 1986, Solomon Islanders had already begun to reduce their dependence upon having large families as their basic insurance policy. The 1986 census figures placed Solomons as one of the highest birth rates in the world . . . 3.4%. In the 1999 census, however, Solomons people reversed that trend and made a 22% decrease to 2.8%, still high by world standards but definitely on the way down. Yes, search out for the clearest explanation why our poverty rate is growing, but study our inept political leadership over the last 24 years. Our population growth, already in decline, is the least likely place to find the reason.

The early 1990s, for instance, gives more than enough examples of the inept political leadership, their poor development policies and lamentable performances to produce our current poverty levels. In the Solomons it took a great deal of official planning, determination and lack of vision to produce the poverty levels the nation now suffers. For instance, during the Mamaloni era (1994-1997), more than $109 million was squandered by giving massive duty remissions to logging companies, both foreign and local. The same trend of duty remissions continued in 2001 and even in the early days of the present government.

The greatest single reason why poverty levels have grown over the last 20 years, however, is traced to our leaders single development focus: the Big Time Operation (BTO): Taiyo, SIPL, Gold Ridge and in the pipeline, Western Province's oil palm (Vangunu) and a major overseas port (Bina, Malaita). Village life has attracted some investment; e.g. schools, clinics, water supplies, roads and other infrastructure. However, governments over the past 20 years have made little effort to insure that paid employment, social amenities, electrification, etc. was part and parcel of village life.

Honiara drew in thousands of disaffected, bored and dispirited youths from all parts of the nation. Honiara's Youth Disturbances (1989, 1993, 1995 and 1997) witnessed to the volatility of bored, jobless and increasingly unruly youth. Rather than have these same youth--the nation's healthiest, best educated and potentially the most productive--they became the favorite recruiting grounds for the militants in 1999-2000.

Corruption at the highest levels of government coupled with poor leadership patterns and flawed development priorities are the basic reasons for Solomons current poverty levels. Little is gained nor understanding helped by focusing on Solomon Islanders for having large families, their only insurance policy they can actually fall back upon.

 

‘STATE GOVERNMENT’


THROWING OUR PEOPLE TO THE DEVILS

By Andrew GH Nori

1. Introduction

I subscribe these views at the threshold of the adoption of ‘state’ or federal system of government in Solomon Islands. With the coming into office of the PAP/Independent alliance there will, undoubtedly, be a keen push for full pledged federalism in our country. In addition to the recommendations of the State Government Task Force (SGTF) they now have the Townsville Peace Agreement as the green light to justify their new initiatives on reactionary political adventurism.

Let me state at the outset that since independence I have been a vocal advocate against the “big bang’ approach to federalism. Instead I have always advised that we approach decentralization and autonomy through the evolutionary process. This is reflected in the Provincial Government White Paper produced and approved by Parliament in 1988.

My views on federalism or on political development for that matter are influenced by the belief that the survival of this country is based on economic discipline, effective organisation and re-organisation of the factors of production, hard-work and on a strong national leadership – not on expanded and power-loaded political structures, political debates, large bureaucracies that accompany decentralization of political power or having autonomous subgroups. Modern advocates of the so-called ‘state government’ are under the baseless and false illusion that under the proposed system the states “…will be able to have some control over their natural resources…” (Tuhaika, Federal/State Government System and its impact on rural development” - 2001) and thereby, they conclude, improve their lot. The falsehood in this statement is the assumption that ‘control’ of resources is the key to development and progress, instead of their effective and sustainable utilization. Provincial or the proposed state governments have not owned and will not own natural resources in Solomon Islands, unless they proceed to legally acquire those resources in accordance with law. All of us know that acquisition of people’s resources by provinces has proved very difficult in the past as opposed to acquisitions by the national government. Resources in Solomon Islands will remain in the hands of the people, not newly created political institutions or structures.

Control of resources does not, in itself, bring about development. You have to marry those resources with capital and manpower. But that is not all. In order for the outcome of that economic formula to fully benefit the populace you require a leadership that knows how to manage the proceeds from economic activities to fully benefit the resource owners. In other words we need, at the highest levels of our governance system, a good sense of stewardship when it comes to using wealth. This is an area which existing provincial leadership (which consists of the same people who are pushing for autonomy) are very poor at, similar to those at the national government level.

2. Current Constitutional Arrangement

The views of the founders of our constitution with regard to power sharing may be detected from section 114 of the Constitution. That section (as amended) neatly states:-

”114. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Solomon Islands Independence Order 1978 Solomon Islands shall be divided into Honiara City and provinces.

(2) Parliament shall by law-

(a) prescribe the number of provinces, and the boundary of Honiara City and the provinces after considering the advice of the Constituency Boundaries Commission;

(b) make provision for the government of Honiara city and the provinces and consider the role of traditional chiefs in the provinces.

For the purpose of this discussion I wish to highlight the provision that requires Parliament to “make provision for the government…” as appearing in paragraph (2)(b) of section 114. These words carry the following constitutional realities about Solomon Islands:

(1) Parliament, which is established under section 46 of the constitution, consisting of persons elected nationwide, is the custodian of the power to govern in Solomon Islands;

(2) Solomon Islands is united under the Constitution, giving rise to the concept of the unitary state;

(3) Parliament is the custodian of the Solomon Islands state; and

(4) Parliament is constitutionally committed to ensuring that provinces have a form of government within the unitary state, thereby allowing for our people’s participation in the governance of their nation.

The duty of Parliament stipulated in section 114 was performed in 1981 with the passage of the Provincial Government Act (PGA). Despite what many critics say about the 1981 PGA, it deserves some careful discussion in order to bring out the real intention of that piece of legislation. I wish to start that discussion under seven subheadings, namely:

(a) number of provinces and their boundaries;
(b) political organisation within provinces;
(c) elections;
(d) power vesting;
(e) services;
(f) legislative functions;
(g) financial arrangements.

(1) Number of Provinces and boundaries

The 1981 PGA established seven provinces, namely Western, Isabel, Central, Malaita, Guadalcanal, Makira & Ulawa and Temotu. The location and boundaries of these provinces were the remnants of post-colonial arrangements, which were wholly based on administrative convenience, considering transportation and communication impediments of the time.

Three matters weighed heavily on the minds of the government when it introduced the 1981 PGA (followed by six amendments and a repeal in 1996 and re-instatement in 1997). These were that-

(a) sustainability of the new provinces would depend on effective and continuing consultation with the national government administration, especially on matters of manpower sharing, resources allocation, accountability and transparency;

(b) the devolution process envisaged under the Act requires regular negotiations and discussions which could be better achieved if there were less number of provinces; and

(c) since provincial governments were expected, foremost, to carry out several key services on behalf of the government regular or constant check on services output was required, as well as ensuring that the level of services did not drop below expected standards.

(2) Political Organisation within Provinces

The political arrangements within a province is a mirror of the national government system in terms of structure – at the top it has the assembly that elects a premier as chief executive who then appoints his executive members from within the assembly. This simple system may appear flat and as a prototype of the national government arrangement but it does have some unique features. These features are :-

(a) Multiple Ownership

Unlike the national government where the right to own property is vested in specific bodies, eg, commissioner of lands etc, at the provinces both the assembly and the premier may hold property on behalf of the province. This gives rise to the concept of multiple trusteeships. Section 29 of the PGA (as amended) permits this where it states-

“29.- (1) A devolution order may provide that any property which-

(a) is held by or on behalf of the Government, and

(b) appears o the Minister to be property used or to be used solely or mainly for a Provincial Assembly or for or in connection with the exercise in a province of devolved functions,

shall be held by or on behalf of the Provincial Assembly or, as the case may be, the Premier of the province.”

(b) Multiple employers

The PGA also allows for the Premier, the executive or the Assembly to employ staff in their own right (see section 29 (f)). The Speaker, too, may employ his own staff with the consent of the assembly, in terms of number of such employees (see section 24(2)). This ascribes to each of the three bodies some degree of corporate status, unlike their counterparts at the national level.

(c) Vesting of powers

The 1981 PGA does not use the term “power”, instead it employs the term “functions”. This was not simply the legal draftsman’s choice of terminology. In fact there is an ideological reason for the choice of language. Provincial governments are to enjoy functional responsibilities, not powers for political adventurism. This understanding may be drawn from the very language and structure of PART III of the 1981 PGA. Responsibilities devolved to provincial governments are to enhance the effective provision and supply of services and duties. I wish to call this “controlled” devolution or “checked” decentralization. It is the very essence of evolutionary local governance, as opposed to the ‘big bang’ approach that demands instant empowerment.

The transfer of functions from the Government to the premier or the assembly or the executive is through a legal vehicle called devolution orders. These are simply orders made by the minister that define and describe the functions to be transferred. These orders are subject to affirmative resolutions in Parliament, meaning that before they become effective, they have to be approved by Parliament just like a Bill.

(3) Elections

Election is held every four years to provincial assemblies at various times, depending on the date the first election was held in each province. Registration of voters is proceeded with in the same way it is done for national parliament elections. In fact registration of voters is carried out under the Provincial Government (Elections) Regulations that are based on the Local Government (Elections) Regulations.

For election purposes a province is divided into wards. These electoral units are demarcated on both population and linguistic or dialectical bases, each with a population ranging from three to five thousand on Malaita to just a few hundreds in Rennell Bellona Province. These wards are the smallest electoral constituents in Solomon Islands.

A member is elected for a ward if he scores the highest ballot at an election, which on many occasions, are not often the majority of votes.

By a latter amendment to the 1981 PGA (No. 5 of 1986) a provision was made for appointment of persons to the assembly. These are called appointed members and are so appointed by the Assembly as a matter of discretion. Some assemblies were known to have made use of this provision to appoint traditional leaders or chiefs to the assemblies, perhaps in a lame attempt to satisfy section 114(2) of the Constitution. Their problem, of course, was that chiefs regarded those appointments as cosmetic as they hardly reflected the chiefly structures of the various wards and tribes in the province.

I have two issues to raise over the provincial electoral process and the composition of the assembly. These issues, I feel, are the causes of much frustration and dissatisfaction in our rural communities. These are-

(a) Electoral Wards

When the 1981 PGA was being conceived it was the general expectation of leaders in rural communities that the new law would have allowed for an affective linkage between the real community leaders and the national government. They had hoped that real tribal leaders would then have the long-awaited chance to take part in the political governance of the affairs of the province and their nation. This hope was justified in all respects – not only in terms of leadership quality and respectability but also in terms of accountability and representational legitimacy.

Many Solomon Islanders relate to leadership structures that pre-exist those structures and systems we adopt under our new laws, eg, parliament, cabinet, assemblies, parliamentarians etc. These are newly manufactured institutions that have no bearings at all with resources ownership and utilization, community leadership and the day-to-day management of the masses.

The electoral wards and the representation of those wards give no recognition or allowance for pre-existing leadership institutions, such as tribal groups and their internal leadership values and priorities.

In many of the coastal villages throughout Solomon Islands eligible candidates have often been persons who were not recognised as leaders in terms of resources management and utilization. Most of them are visitors to the area from other places or are church leaders with no tribal connection in the wards. They are, so they say, rootless leaders, depending only on state laws for their protection, elevation (as leaders) and recognition. Culturally, they are without any recognisable foundations. This is the biggest weakness in the representational system we develop under the PGA regime - not the process of devolution involving transferring functional responsibilities to provinces on gradual bases and by negotiations.

I shall deal later with how we could improve the system of representation in our country, especially in terms of power sharing below Parliament.

(b) Executive leadership

The executive leadership in a Province consists of the Premier and his executive members, who were, until 1986, without any official titles. Executive members are appointment by the Minister from amongst members of the assembly, acting on the advice of the Premier.

The Premier is elected by secret ballot by an absolute majority of votes of the assembly members.

Again this system of electing the province’s chief executive is a prototype of the national government arrangement. Its main weakness lies in a conglomerate of factors, namely-

(i) Lack of power base

Most often candidacy for the post of premier is determined in last minute political manoeuvres made a few days just before the premier’s ballot is taken. Like the national parliament, the absence of political parties at provincial level and the apparent obscurity of candidates in terms of provincial politics often lead to election of leaders who lack any power base in the province.

(ii) Political Illiteracy

Most often persons who get elected to the post of premier have very little knowledge of the functions and duties expected of them under the provincial government system. They often take office with the ambition of becoming mini prime ministers with equal clout, respect and performance. Instead of taking efforts to discharge their statutory and legal duties as expected of them under the enabling legislation they, with others, often spend most of their time squabbling about having more powers and responsibilities. The reality is that there are adequate legislative and statutory powers vested in provinces to carry out the various functions devolved to them.

(iii) Leadership Discipline

Leadership discipline is lacking at both the national and provincial levels. However, its absence in provinces where leaders are closer to the eyes of the people poses serious impediments on efforts to gain the trust and confidence of the population. Governments are seen through the quality of the people who man them. It is bad publicity for the system to have someone as premier whose life borders on political indiscipline, immorality, unethical behaviours and carelessness.

A major improvement to provincial leadership may come if premiers were elected under a provincial franchise rather than just by the assembly members.

(4) Service delivery

The 1981 PGA is premised on the belief that governance is about effective and efficient service delivery – nothing less, nothing more. It recognises that the national government administration is too far away in Honiara so as to deliver services on time and at a level consistent with the genuine needs of the recipients. For this reason the PGA develops a principal/agent arrangement whereunder the province would act as agents for the national government in the delivery of vital services. A list of the services covered by this statutory agency is at Schedule 6 to the PGA. These are-

Trade and industry
Transport
Agriculture
Health
Welfare and other social services
Housing
Information
Forestry
Education
Electricity
Tourism; and
Corporate or Statutory Bodies.

In order to fully appreciate the service delivery mechanism provided for under the PGA it is important to understand the nature and extent of the services devolvable or transferable under the Act.

First, the provision of services is not a matter that requires new legislation by the Province. Where a particular national law governs a service such law will remain in force and will continue to regulate both the quality and quantity of the services to be provided. Provinces are only required to be the implementers of the services. They do not legislate for those services.

Taking the first listed service under “Trade and Industry” the Schedule states “Employment. Co-operatives. Local trades and industries. In practice the effects of and scope of this provision are that the Provincial Executive may-

(a) employ personnel for the purpose of carrying out or furthering trade and industry in Provinces, but the law to govern such employment will remain the Employment Act, the Labour Act and other labour-related laws enacted by Parliament, applicable and in force in Solomon Islands;

(b) Promote and encourage the development of co-operatives,

local trade and industry within the province, using personnel employed for that purpose.

Under the listed item of “Forestry” the Province cannot issue license but certainly may proceed to engage in forestry management and conservation. When this provision is read with Schedule 4 paragraph 12 it is legally permissible for provinces to engage in forestry harvesting and utilisation.

In the fields of health and education the quality of services carried by provinces have been pathetic, most often because they divert financial allocations given by the National Government into areas which are either politically lucrative or personally accessible.

In reality, therefore, provinces should have been very busy houses when it comes to service delivery to the populace - carrying out things that were intended to improve the living standards and welfare of the people.

(5) Legislative Functions

Schedule 4 to the PGA describes the various matters over which provincial assemblies may legislate. These are-

Trade and industry
- Local licensing of professions, trades and businesses. Local marketing.

Cultural and Environmental Matters
- Local crafts. Historical remains. Protection of wild creatures

Transport
- Coastal and lagoon shipping. Provision, maintenance and improvement of harbours, roads and bridges,

Finance
- Raising revenue by-
(1) Head tax
(2) Property tax
(3) Fees for services performed or licensed issued by or on behalf of the Provincial Executive (other than services performed or license issued by them as agent for another); and
(4) Such other means as may be approved for the purpose of this paragraph by the Minister by order.

Agriculture and Fisheries
- Animal husbandry. Management of Agriculture land. Grants, loans and subsidies in respect of agricultural production. Protection, improvement and maintenance of fresh-water and reef-fisheries.

Land and Land Use
- Codification and amendment of existing customary law about land. Registration of customary rights in respect of land including customary fishing rights. Physical planning except within a local planning area (within the meaning of the Town and Country Planning Act or an area to which Part IV of that Act has been applied (development areas).

Local Matters
- Fire services and fire protection. Waste disposal and cleansing services. Rest houses. Eating houses and similar places. Public conveniences. Vagrancy. Public nuisances. Cemeteries. Parks and recreation grounds. Markets. Keeping of domestic animals. Building standards.

Local Government
- The constitution, area and general powers and duties of Area Councils and similar bodies, their revenue and expenditure.

- The making of bye-laws by such bodies, that is, laws-
(1) Affecting only the area of responsibility of the body;
(2) Not having effect until confirmed by the Provincial Executive; and
(3) Not made for the purpose for which provision is made by, or is or may be made under, any other enactment.

- To determine by resolution of the Provincial Assembly the salaries and allowances to be paid in respect of area councillors.

Housing
- Housing. Regulation of rents.

Rivers and Water
- Control and use of river waters. Pollution of water. Provision of water supplies (other than urban water supply, in areas prescribed by the Minister under the Solomon Islands Water Authority Act).

Liquor
- Liquor licensing

Corporate or Statutory Bodies
- Establishment of corporate or statutory bodies for the provision of provincial services including economic activity.

I have listed these legislative matters in order to highlight the volume of activities over which existing provincial assemblies have powers to legislate. Provincial governments are not just powerless institutions, lacking in any form of autonomy. In a united country like Solomon Islands Parliament can never be expected to grant full autonomy to provinces or states, as this will be tantamount to independence, which is totally outside federalism.

To press my point further let us revisit Schedule 4 of the PGA and re-examine in detail the assemblies’ actual legislative capacities. These powers may be categorised into three main areas, namely, service, development and finance. Under service we have matters for which an assembly may legislate in order to enhance and maximise delivery of services. Development matters are areas over which the assembly may legislate to energise and promote development of new areas, whether they are natural resources or improving the political structure to promote effective development activities (which may also involve effective service delivery). And finance issues are those that the assembly may legislate on in order to generate income for the province to assist in service delivery or in carrying out development activities.

Legislative Powers of Provincial Assemblies in table form

Subject
Service
Development
Finance*
Trade & Industry      
  Licensing of professions Local marketing Licensing of professions
Licensing of trade
Cultural and Environmental Matters Local crafts
Historical remains
Protection of wild creatures
Local crafts  
Transport Coastal and lagoon shipping Coastal and lagoon shipping  
  Provision, maintenance and improvement of harbours, roads and bridges Provision, maintenance and improvement of harbours, roads and bridges  
Finance     Head tax
Property tax
Fees for services
Other means as may be approved by he Minister@
Agriculture and Fishing

Management of agricultural land.


Protection, improvement and maintenance of fresh-water and reef fisheries.

Animal husbandry


Management of agricultural land

Grants, loans and
Subsidies in respect of agricultural production#
Land and Land Use   Codification of customary land law about land, registration of customary rights. Physical planning.  
Local Matters Fire services; fire protection; waste disposal and cleansing services; eating houses; public conveniences; vagrancy; public nuisances; cemeteries; parks and recreational grounds; markets; keeping of domestic animals. Rest houses, eating houses; Building standards
 
Local Government   Constitution of Area Councils Making laws for revenues of Area Councils
Housing   Housing Regulation of rents
Rivers and Water Control and use of river waters; Pollution of water Provision of water supplies Provision of water supplies (levying consumption charges for it)
Liquor Liquor licensing   Liquor licensing
Corporate bodies   Establishment of corporate and statutory bodies for provision of services and investment Establishment of corporate bodies for investment purposes

This is the full extent of the legislative functions vested in provincial assemblies. The question is, are they adequate for provincial needs? Let us look at some of the areas listed in the table and analyse their practical scopes:

(a) Trade and Industry

Under this subject provinces are empowered to control business activities by licensing. They also regulate markets in the same way. This may appear to be a minor area of legislative competence but it is one under which provinces may generate much revenue if they adopt more open and pre-emptive policies. Instead, to-date, many provincial leaders have been using this legislative mechanism to exclude worthwhile business activities by imposing exorbitant fees and refusing others to invest in their provinces.

A soundly regulated licensing regime in provinces could be a vital opener to investment.

(b) Cultural and Environmental Matters

The power vested in provinces under this subject is targeted at promoting cultural awareness and at the protection of local fauna – an essential component in development.

(c) Transport and lagoon shipping

Under this heading provinces should have made laws to regulate safety of coastal and lagoon shipping, which could include provisions for passenger safety and quality of shipping services.

(d) Finance

Provinces are permitted to enact laws to raise revenue by head tax, property tax, fees and SUCH OTHER MEANS as may be approved by the Minister by order.

Why the PGA worded this particular provision the way it did I am not sure. However, from provincial perspective, it virtually gives the provinces unrestricted avenue through which it could negotiate with the Minister for more unlimited revenue raising powers.

“Property tax” as used under this section is not restricted to registered land located in urban or semi-urban centres as has been the case up to now. The province could have used this power to enact legislation to raise property tax from other forms of assets. My suggestion is that they should do away with the head tax and raise revenue from property. This will force property owners to utilize their assets more efficiently and effectively.

Also using the same provision provinces could have asked the Minister to empower them to raise revenue from road and lagoon traffic, fuel consumption, services levies at wharves and selected public utilities.

(e) Management of Agricultural Land

This is where provincial assemblies should have enacted laws to govern how we should deal with land, relative to the impact of cash-cropping on available land resources; use of land to prevent erosion and ensuring that activities not conducive to proper land use, such as logging, are not allowed within certain areas of agricultural land.

Under this head, too, assemblies should have declared, by law, existing ‘agricultural opportunity areas’ (“AOAs”) identified in provinces as agricultural land.

This head also permits provinces to issue grants, loans and subsidies in respect of agricultural production. This power alone should have revolutionalised provincial development to a large scale. No provinces, through ignorance of this vested power, ever conceived and invoked the idea of establishing in provinces a separate agricultural loans and grant schemes which could have been managed jointly by the Development Bank of Solomon Islands. No credit schemes were ever set-up, leaving farmers to vent for themselves. What we could have done was to declare the AOA’s as agricultural land, set-up credit schemes and target our financing at these AOAs. Agricultural production would have increased allowing our people to increase their income levels and thereby improving their standards of living. None was ever thought of by our provincial leaders.

(f) Land and Land Use

The devolution of land and land use to provincial assemblies is one of the backbones of our decentralization regime. If fully realised, it would have been the springboard for land reform, enhanced rural development and community progress.

Looking at the recent so-called ‘bona fide’ demands of the people of Guadalcanal, this is what the Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly should have used. Instead it was demanding the Government to amend the Land & Titles Act, which only covers 8% of arable land on Guadalcanal. Provinces have had this legislative gold mine since 1981 and they failed to use it to their people’s advantage.

Under this specific power our provincial assemblies should have carried out comprehensive surveys and research on the state and commonalities of practices and rules applicable to customary land rights and usage. They should then have proceeded to codify those common rules and have them enacted as ordinances by assemblies. By doing this we will develop our common law on c