Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation

Can Solomon Islands Claim 21st Century?

By Geoffrey Kaka

Solomon Islands enters the 21st century with many of the world's poorest countries. Incomes, assets, and access to essential services are unequally distributed and the rural areas of the Solomons contains a growing share of the world's absolute poor, who have little power to influence the allocation of resources.

Moreover, many development problems have become largely confined to Solomon Islands. They include lagging primary and high school education in rural areas, health services and other institutions.
Many countries have made important economic reforms, improving macroeconomic management, liberalising markets and trade, and widening the space for private sector activity. Where these reforms have been sustained - and underpinned by civil peace - they have raised growth and incomes and reduced poverty. Even as parts of the pacific region are making headlines with ethnic tension and natural disasters, other parts are making headway with rising interest from domestic and foreign businesses and higher investment.

But the response has not been sufficient to overcome years of falling income or to reverse other adverse legacies from the long period of economic decline - including deteriorated Solomon Islands capacity, weakened institutions, and inadequate infrastructure. Major changes are needed if Solomon Islanders - and their children - are to claim the 21st century. With Solomon Islands rapidly growing population, 5 percent annual growth is needed simply to keep the number of poor from rising.

Moreover, Solomon Islands will not be able to sustain rapid growth without investing in its people and in particular tertiary students both at home and abroad. Many of our rural areas lack the health, education, and access to inputs needed to contribute to - and benefit from - high growth. Women are one of Solomon's hidden growth reserves, providing some of the region's labour, but their productivity is hampered by widespread inequality in education and access. Thus gender equality can be a potent force for accelerated poverty reduction.
Solomon Islands thus faces an immense, multifaceted development challenge. But the new century offers a window of opportunity to reverse the marginalisation of Solomon Island's people - and of Solomon Island's governments, relative to donors, in the development agenda. The time has come for political participation to sharply increase, paving the way for more accountable government, and there is greater consensus on the need to move away from the failed models of the past. In my recent contribution on "Good Governance for Solomon Islands" I have tried to emphasise how important it is for Solomon Islands politician to play their part in the development process.
All in all, making these benefits materialise will require a ``business plan'' conceived and owned by Solomon Islanders, and supported by donors through coordinated, longterm partnerships. Solomon Islands culture differs widely, so there is no universal formula for success. But many countries face similar issues, and can draw on positive examples of how to address them.

Improving governance and resolving conflict is perhaps the most basic requirement for faster development. Widespread civil conflicts impose enormous costs, including on neighbouring countries. Contrary to popular belief, Solomon Island's conflicts donot stem from ethnic diversity alone but rather, in a pattern found around the world, conflicts are driven by poverty, underdevelopment, and lack of economic diversification, as well as by political systems that marginalise large parts of the population. But conflicts perpetuate poverty, creating a vicious circle that can be reversed only through special development efforts - including longrun peacebuilding and political reforms. With success in these areas, countries can grow rapidly, and flight capital can return.

Countries that have made the greatest gains in political participation are also those with better economic management. Again, this conforms to a global pattern that suggests multiethnic states can grow as fast as homogeneous ones - if they sustain participatory political systems. Solomon Islands therefore, need to develop political models that facilitate consensus building and include marginalised groups.

Development programs need to be winwin, improving the management and distribution of economic resources and contributing to more effective states. Programs should empower citizens to hold governments accountable, enable governments to respond to new demands, and enforce compliance with the economic and political rules of the game. Development efforts may start to move in this direction, with greater beneficiary involvement in the delivery of services and more emphasis on results. But far more needs to be done to strengthen Solomon Island's institutions - including ensuring that representative institution, such as parliaments, play their proper role in economic and budgetary oversight.

Investing in people is also essential for accelerated poverty reduction in Solomon Islands. Solomon Islanders are caught in a trap of high fertility and mortality, low education (especially of women - less than onequarter of poor rural girls attend primary school), high dependency ratios, and low savings.

While the resources available for education and health are inadequate in Solomon Islands, many need to translate their existing commitment to human development into effective programs for delivering essential services and increasing gender equality. Solomon inherits some of strongest communities in the Pacific, yet services are usually provided through weak, centralised institutions that are seen as remote and ineffective by those they are supposed to serve. Deconcentrated service delivery through local communities, supported by capacity building at local levels and effective governance to ensure transparency and empower recipients, could have a major impact. These could be done with effective regional cooperation and donor support through coordinated long-term partnerships.

Increasing competitiveness and diversifying economies must be a third area of focus if Solomon Islands is to claim this new century. Job creation is slow not because of labor market rigidities (though there are exceptions) but because of the high perceived risks and costs of doing business in Solomon Islands. These need to be lowered by locking in reforms and delivering business services more efficiently - with less corruption, better infrastructure and financial services, and increased access to the information economy. Solomon Islands trails the world on every dimension of these essentials. Lowering these barriers requires new approaches, including more participation by the private sector and by local communities, a more regional approach to overcome the problems posed by their rural communities, and a central government shift to regulating and facilitating services rather than providing them.

Reducing aid dependence and strengthening partnerships will have to be a fourth component of Solomon's development strategy. Concessional assistance is essential if Solomon Islands is to grow rapidly while also increasing consumption to reduce poverty. Excluding private inflows, the savings gap for a typical country is about 17 percent of GDP, and other regions show that private flows cannot be sustained at more than 5 percent of GDP without risk of crisis. But aid, particularly when delivered in a weak institutional environment by large numbers of donors with fragmented projects and requirements, can weaken institutional capacity and undermine accountability.

High debt and debt service add to the problem, deterring private investment and absorbing core budget resources, making governments ever more ``cash poor'' but ``project rich,'' with a development agenda increasingly perceived as being shaped by donors. Lack of selectivity compounds the problem, channelling a lot of aid to countries with poor development policies. And with few exceptions, aid has largely been confined to national boundaries rather than used to stimulate regional and international public goods.

These problems should be widely recognised, and a consensus has emerged that the primary goal of aid should be to reduce poverty. But paradoxically, aid transfers are declining just when many of the problems are being addressed. Solomon Islands enters the new century in the midst of intense debate on aid. New aid relationships are being implemented - relationships that emphasize a holistic, country-driven approach supported by donors on the basis of long-term partnerships, and with greater beneficiary participation and empowerment over the use of resources.

If there is going to be any change in the right direction for the Solomon Islands, I believe there is a long way to go. In a typical poor country like our Solomon Island, aid transfers might equal 10 percent of GDP, yet the poorest fifth of the population disposes of only about 4 percent of GDP. It remains to be seen how well partnerships can resolve the tensions between the objectives of recipients and individual donors, and how far the behaviour of donors will change to facilitate Solomon Islands ownership of its development agenda. It also remains to be seen how far partnerships can extend beyond assistance, to include enhanced opening of world markets to Solomon Islands products and services.

Several off-shore based Solomon Islanders have graciously welcome me On Line and, while they do not agree with most (or all) of the things I say, have kindly asked me to describe some of the key events which occurred prior to, on and subsequent to 5th June, 2000. They also revealed to me that during the 18 months subsequent to the coup much filth has been thrown at me and at the MEF leadership both on the Internet discussion boards and elsewhere.

In fact I have read nearly all of the adverse, muddy and derogatory publicity levelled at me on the various Internet websites since January 2000. I have decided to observe, listen and gauge public opinion. The events of the past three years have, no doubt, brought serious consequences to our country. Every right thinking Solomon Islander has the right to air grievances and to level criticisms at those who, according to his or her perception and conviction, were responsible. The level of anger displayed only reflects the love and affinity each has for Solomon Islands.

The events of the past three years cannot be compacted into a few pages but the followings are a brief of what I feel need to be said, for discussion purposes.

Features of a democratic state

No useful discussion or dialogue will be achieved on the subject at hand without us understanding and acknowledging some of the pertinent features of our democratic state. When Solomon Islands became independent on 7 July 1978 we adopted a written constitution, which provides for the manner in which the state is to be governed and how individual citizens should relate to that state and to each other. A powerful thread that runs through those two categories of relationships (state/citizen and citizen/citizen) is the Rule of Law. This rule, which is the hall-mark of any civilised society, requires, amongst other things, that whatever rights, demands or claims one desires to exert has to be legally based and accepted as such by the state and other citizens. Similarly, if any person demands something from any other person then that other person has the right to ask “under what law are you demanding me to act or do what you want me to do”? We have a country that requires its citizens to act in accordance with set rules and standards.

As we all understand, our country is a new one – only 23 years old – and struggling to come to grips with new legal norms. There are many areas of our traditionally accepted behaviour that are not adequately or, at all, covered by any written rules.

Demands on the State

Solomon Islands law provides for a channel through which individuals and groups may put demands on the state in the same way that the state may also put demands on its citizens. There is a legal channel for state/person dialogue. At the top end of this channel we have the National Parliament. In the middle we have the executive and judicial arms of the government. This includes the provincial governments and area councils. At the bottom we have the people with their chiefs and tribal leaders.

For developmental purposes all citizens are ranked equal. As much as possible the state must ensure that resources are shared and utilised equitably in order to allow fair treatment of citizens. If a complaint arises regarding sharing and utilisation of the nation’s resources or wealth, then – using the channel of communication - such complaint may be put to the appropriate organs of the state, be it the executive, the judiciary or the legislature.

Jumping the Que

In Solomon Islands we must accept that there is uneven distribution of educated manpower. In the channel of communication I described above there is the likelihood that some provinces or groups may be better equipped and prepared to “negotiate” or “bargain” their way through more effectively and efficiently than others, resulting in them receiving more benefits from state institutions. Where these negotiations and bargaining are done within the bounds of the law and are wholly based on free exchange of ideas there is nothing wrong with them. People get educated and more efficient at their own choice and by their own hard work. By doing so they become better negotiators and often get what they want.

The channel of dialogue herein described may be lengthy, cumbersome, full of paperwork and, sometimes, non responsive. But IT IS the accepted channel. There should not be any shortcuts. No jumping the que.

Guadalcanal Demands

By petition presented to the Solomon Islands Government (SIG) on 24th March 1988 the Guadalcanal Provincial Government (GPG) demanded that the national government introduces “state government’ in Solomon Islands. The petition also asked the SIG to return all alienated land on Guadalcanal to the original landowners or to the GPG.

Also, during the course of 1988 there were demands by groups on Guadalcanal, supported by their Provincial leaders, for the SIG and for the Malaita Province to pay compensation for the lives of Guadalcanal persons killed by Malaitans in the past. But these Malaita offenders have already been convicted by the courts and sentenced to terms of imprisonment.

The SIG obviously did not respond favourably to the demands. From what I know the SIG dismissed the demands as being made outside the normal channel of communication and did not have the backing of the law. For example, demands for state government are matters that touch on our national constitution and cannot be pressed for by one or two provinces. The constitution belongs to the whole country, not just a few provinces and their leaders. If a change is required to the constitution it has to come by way of very clear mandate from the populace either by way of a review or a referendum.

Rightly the government could not accept demands for compensation for people who were murdered by criminals – if it did, it would open a floodgate for future unjustified claims each time a person is murdered. The victims’ relatives do, of course, have the right to claim for damages from the offender or, as allowed by custom, against the relatives of the offender – but definitely, not against the Government.

Inconsistency in pressing the demands

The demands by the people of Guadalcanal, through the GPG, remained in abeyance and unattended to until mid-1998. In about May 1998 two Malaita girls studying at the Ruavatu Provincial High School on Guadalcanal were raped. The parents and guardians claimed compensation from the school and from the GPG, which was the education authority responsible for the school. The claim was legitimate in that the rape was alleged to be the result of poor security provided by the school. Even in law the claim could have been made for damages arising from negligence on the part of the school authority. When the school and the GPG did not meet the demand the parents approached the SIG, which agreed to make the payment. The matter did not end there – SIG, on the advice of Ulufa’alu, proceeded to deduct the sum paid (being ($16,000) from the revenue sharing grants due to the GPG. The argument by the SIG was that it was not legally obligated to pay compensation – the school is owned by the GPG and it should make the payments. The action by Ulufa’alu’s government infuriated Premier Alebua who, in blind retaliation, immediately demanded that the government pays $100,000 per head for the 25 Guadalcanal people killed by Malaitans during the past 20 years. Later the demand was expanded to include other issues such as state government, return of alienated land, rental for Honiara land, SIPL shares, internal migration and squatting on customary land.

In respect of the demands by the GPG, which re-emerged in July 1998, I have three obvious observations:

(a) The issues raised and the mode of presentation of the demands were wholly outside the Provincial Government’s legislative and executive powers as described in the Provincial Government Act (PGA). Under the PGA provincial governments are agents of the national government and are only empowered to provide services and perform executive duties on behalf of the national government. In terms of legislative competence, provinces’ powers are limited.

Nowhere in the PGA are provinces allowed or empowered to pressurise the government on political issues or to pursue matters that do not fall within their devolved powers and functions.

(b) The earlier demands of March 1988 were never consistently pursued for a period of ten years and only re-emerged in 1998 when a Malaitan became prime minister. Those same demands were never raised, discussed or touched upon when non Malaitans were holding the post of prime minister: Late Mamaloni was in office between June 1989 and May 1993 and again between October 1994 and August 1997 and Billy Hilly between May, 1993 and October, 1994. If the Guadalcanal people were genuinely interested in what they later called their ‘bona fide demands’ they could have raised them with Mamaloni who was always known to be a strong advocate of state government and supportive of the Guadalcanal people.

(c) the demands were re-ignited in 1998 simply because the government decided to deduct from Guadalcanal Provincial grants the sum of $16,000, being compensation paid to the parents and guardians of girls raped at Ruavatu PHS. The deduction was, in my view, quite legitimate and proper. The problem was that in involved Malaita students, Malaita parents and a Malaita prime minister.

My opinion is that the re-emergence of these demands in July, 1998 was politically motivated and was made as a precursor to the subsequent ethnic uprising, which followed. The Guadalcanal Provincial leadership and many of their advisers (some known academics) got fed up with Malaitans generally and wanted them out of their province. At the bottom of it all was ethnic hatred.

Formation of GRA

Soon after Alebua’s letter in mid July, 1998 a meeting was held at Tambea Resort, west Guadalcanal, at which several key Guadalcanal leaders were present and participated. These included Alebua, two senior Guadalcanal Police officers, Sethuel Kelly and many young Guadalcanal men, including Harold Keke and Joseph Sangu. One of them, John Taloi, a part Malaitan, later defected to the MEF side and disclosed the whole truth. A decision was made then to forcefully evict Malaitans from Guadalcanal. Not long afterwards, armed men raided the Yandina Police armoury. The GRA was born and the burning, looting, raping, chasing and murdering started. In the process, Malaitans suffered dearly.

The eviction of Malaitans from east Guadalcanal resulted in the closure of SIPL. All commercial and economic activities on west and east Guadalcanal were closed. Gold Ridge remained in operation but with very uncertain security situation. This too closed on 8th June, 2000.

Ethnic Cleansing by GRA/IFM

It may be recalled that between July 1998 and August, 1999 criminals on Guadalcanal, with the full support of their provincial leaders, took up arms with the sole purpose of unlawfully evicting Malaitans from their province. In the process they raped women, burned homes and properties and killed 28 innocent Malaitans. On at least two occasions they forced Malaita men to have sexual intercourse with their daughters and sisters in the presence of others!. Malaitans escaped into Honiara and filled up the Multi Purpose Hall at Lawson Tama, in transit to their villages on Malaita – many of them with only the clothes they wore. With the assistance of the Taiwanese Government these displaced and inhumanly treated Solomon Islanders were transported back to their villages – angry, frustrated and confused as to why it was all happening. During the period when these miserable people stayed at the Multi Purpose Hall in Honiara I happened to visit them on at least three occasions – I did not see any representatives of SICA, Civil Society, SIDT or any others who are now very noisy calling for post-conflict justice.

Inaction by SIG and the Police

The SIG, led by Ulufa’alu, did nothing to halt the illegal and genocidal activities of the GRA or IFM, targeted at Malaita people. Although the Police had adequate military firepower (MEF discovered this later) to stop the ethnic uprising on Guadalcanal, it decided not to act or was prevented from acting. The reason was political - the SIAC administration, led by Ulufa’alu, had six prominent Guadalcanal ministers in it that held the balance of power. These were Sir Baddley Devesi, Walter Naeson, Victor Ngele, Hilda Kari, David Vouza and Johnson Koli. Their voters (if not themselves) were directly involved in the criminal activities committed against Malaitans. Any military offensive against the GRA/IFM, which might have resulted in many deaths, could lead to the “walking out” from SIAC by these Guadalcanal MPs and the apparent collapse and dismantling of the SIAC coalition. The government, therefore, decided to adopt a policy of appeasement. The immediate reaction of Malaitans was obvious. They believed that Ulufa’alu purposely and wilfully decided to sacrifice the lives of innocent Malaitans for the sake of his own political survival! This behaviour was considered an act of betrayal in the highest degree. It was a slap on the face of the people of Malaita Province.

Unrepentant GRA/IFM

The last murder of a Malaitan by the GRA/IFM took place in the Malatoha area of northeast Guadalcanal in late August 1999, well after the various peace accords were signed between the SIG and the GPG, representing the GRA/IFM. Despite this, the displaced Malaitans - on my advice and on the advice of other Malaita leaders - decided not to retaliate but waited for a peaceful resolution of their claims. Their position was that they be fully compensated for the destruction and damages caused to lives and property and for the inhuman acts committed on their relatives. They waited patiently.

Commonwealth Initiatives

The peace initiatives by the Commonwealth Secretariat through Rabuka, Adefeye and the peace monitoring teams from Fiji and Vanuatu were steps taken with genuine intentions. Their failures were ascribable to three factors not of their making, namely-

(a) the GRA/IFM was not represented at the various peace conferences which led to the signing of previous accords and agreements and therefore could not be pinned down to or held accountable for the performance of the terms of those agreements;

(b) Alebua was not genuine about ending the armed uprising and, contrary to his public presentations, did not fully speak the minds of militants on Guadalcanal – rather by then he lost control over the militant activities in his Province; and

(c) The SIG and the GPG underestimated the ability and eagerness of Malaitans to retaliate and simply took matters too lightly and too slowly (SIAC spokesman Sasako once said that the so-called crisis was “a storm in a teacup”).

The arms surrender, which the GRA/IFM was required to undertake under the terms of the Honiara Peace Accord and the Panatina Agreement, yielded miserable results. The “weapons’ collected by the peace monitoring team consisted of spears, bows and arrows, knives and axes, slings and a few manufactured weapons. None of the high-powered weapons previously supplied to the GRA/IFM by Guadalcanal police officers were surrendered, nor were the 30 or more other manufactured rifles removed from various gun license holders on Guadalcanal, including Malaitans. The exercise made a mockery of the peace initiatives by the Commonwealth.

Refusal to pay compensation

By mid-November, 1999 many of the displaced Malaitans were becoming frustrated. GRA/IFM were dishonouring all the peace agreements and the government appeared to be treating property claims with a no-care attitude. The displaced Malaitans, therefore, organised a march to Parliament House to present a petition to Ulufa’alu, demanding that their claims for compensation be addressed urgently (even if not payable immediately). Ulufa’alu’s reply was the most insensitive, stupid and arrogant statement a leader could have ever made in the circumstance. He told the marchers something to the effect that “the SIG was not responsible for the damages caused and should not pay compensation”. He further said that he himself also lost his property on west Guadalcanal and did not make any claims (a claim which was later proved false when aerial photographs were taken the next day of his houses at Kodovele in west Guadalcanal). A day later talkative and speech-hungry Alfred Sasako, Ulufa’alu’s minister of state, repeated the same statement over national radio. Soon after Paterson Oti, Foreign Affairs Minister, confirmed the same position, also over national radio. These men added insult to injury. These immature leaders literally struck the match that caused the fire that burned the nation to near ashes up to October 2000. I am surprised that both Ulufa’alu and Oti saw it fit to contest for the post of prime minister following the recent parliamentary elections. They might have the qualifications in their respective professions but, certainly, possess no leadership qualities at all.

Birth of the MEF

In late November 1999, not long after the public statements issued by Ulufa’alu and his two ministers, a group of young Malaitans who were amongst those who were badly treated by the GRA/IFM on west and northeast Guadalcanal, formed themselves into what is now known as the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF). A decision was taken by the displaced Malaitans that they were going to fight back!

On 17/1/00 MEF’s first operation took place when 13 men and two girls (a nurse and a telecommunication technician) raided the Auki armoury for weapons and were highly successful. News of this successful raid and the subsequent euphoria made many young Malaitans joined the ranks and files of the newly formed MEF, eager for an all-out war against the unheeding and unrepentant GRA/IFM. But despite the fact that by then the MEF members had weapons in their possession they did not launch any attack against the GRA/IFM – they insisted on their claims being met.

Unanswered submissions

One week after the raid of the Auki armoury a 16-page submission prepared by myself on behalf of the Malaita Displaced People’s Committee was forwarded to the SIG, through the offices of the Prime Minister and Home Affairs, calling for immediate discussions and suggesting a formula for resolution of the claims. This submission was forwarded on or about 24 January, 2000. No reply was ever received from the Prime Minister or the Minister for Home Affairs, despite repeated telephone inquiries. Instead of addressing the issues as submitted, Ulufa’alu decided to hold further peace conferences under a policy he called “Peace before Justice” (that no compensation would be paid unless peace is fully restored) forgetting that three peace conferences had already been held and agreements signed, all broken by the GRA/IFM. The argument by the displaced Malaitans was that justice must come before peace – meaning, unless they are compensated there would be no peace. By May 2000 Ulufa’alu remained firm on his government’s misconceived policy. A peace conference was convened at Buala in Isabel Province, which the MEF and Malaita Province did not attend.

Between March and May 2000 I personally held meetings with the Prime Minister and his advisers and with the Guadalcanal Provincial Premier and his executive, asking that they do something about the compensation claims and to provide a report on Malaitans missing on Guadalcanal. I warned them of the likelihood of the situation deteriorating further if nothing happened. As usual they ignored my advice.

The Coup of 5th June 2000

By the end of May, the stage was ready for a disaster. Feelings of retaliation and revenge were at their highest. Frustration over SIAC’s “peace before justice” policy reached its climax. On 3rd June 2000 at a joint meeting of the MEF and the police paramilitary a decision was made to overthrow the government. The coup, code named ‘Operation Malaita Dawn’ was planned for the early hours of 5th June 2000. The rest is history.

I learned of the proposed coup at 3 pm on 4th June 2000 when I was invited to a meeting of the joint MEF Paramilitary command. At that meeting I was informed that the plan was irreversible and I was asked to become the prime minister, abrogate the constitution and call for a new election. I told the joint command that I could never accept such an unlawful appointment. After a long argument I decided instead to assist in the process of restoring democracy and constitutional governance and to provide professional assistance in any peace negotiations and in property settlement discussions. As soon as the coup was launched I demanded written instructions confirming my engagement. The terms of engagement included a provision that the coup leaders must not interfere with any decision I take on matters concerning the return of Solomon Islands to constitutional governance.

On 5th June 2000, after delivering the speech to the nation at 11 am, I embarked on a plan to oversee the transition back to democratic rule. The curfew imposed during the day resulted in relative peace throughout Honiara with no looting as was expected. I then organised meetings with resident foreign embassies, the Governor General, the Government Caucus and church leaders holding consultations and seeking advice. The result of these meetings was that a formula was agreed upon which would see resolution of the chaotic situation the nation was caught in. Considering that the coup leaders were not prepared to abandon their demand for the resignation of Ulufa’alu as prime minister, we proposed that-

(a) Ulufa’alu to remain in office in the interim;

(b) Parliament to be recalled for an urgent meeting;

(d) The coup leaders would have to accept a new parliamentary mandate exercised even to re-elect Ulufa’alu as prime minister.

The reason for proposing this formula was that if Ulufa’alu was forced to resign while under house arrest it would have amounted to duress and might not be taken lightly by the international community. However, the Government Caucus, or at least many of them, had formed the opinion that despite the above agreed guidelines it would be advisable for Ulufa’alu to resign voluntarily. It was on their advice (although denied later by Ulufa’alu) that he tendered his resignation on 23rd June 2000. By that time Ulufa’alu was no longer under any form of house detention and was moving freely in Honiara.

The join MEF/Paramilitary command did not take any position as to who should replace Ulufa’alu as prime minister. They however encouraged SIAC to put up a candidate and even suggested that Rev. Boseto would be a good candidate. They did not favour Sogavare or anyone in the Opposition to be elected prime minister. In fact, to my knowledge, none of the leaders of the MEF or the Police Paramilitary had any political connection with either the Leader of Opposition or with Dausabea and others.

Ulufa’alu and his associates, including John Roughan (Ulufa’alu’s close ally, going by his recent comments), the Civil Society and others claimed that the events of 5th June was politically orchestrated by the Parliamentary Opposition. This assumption is totally contrary to what I know and what actually transpired. Instead of making personal guesses let us look at what the High Court Acting Chief Justice Palmer had to say, after reading all the documentary evidence submitted to him in the recent case which Ulufa’alu took against me and others (Civil Case No. 195 of 2000) – bearing in mind that in that case Ulufa’alu advanced the theory that the Opposition orchestrated the coup. By way of background this is what the learned Acting Chief Justice said:-

“The matters giving rise to the application of the Applicant (Ulufa’alu) before this Court emanate from the events which occurred on the early morning hours of 5th June 2000. It is important to appreciate however that what happened that morning was the culmination of unforeseen, unfortunate and unprecedented train of events, which rocked the country and continue to shake its foundation. The situation prior to 5th June was not stable. The rule of law in the country had been severely undermined by rebel groups and criminals on Guadalcanal Island who showed no respect for the law. These initially formed themselves into a group called the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (“GRA”), which later changed its name to Guadalcanal Liberation Army (“GLA”), then changed to the Isatabu Freedom Fighters (“IFF”) and finally the Isatabu Freedom Movement (“IFM”). It was not clear what exactly their agenda was, but it started off as grievances arising from murders of Guadalcanal people, (many of the accused had been tried under the criminal law of this country and convicted), illegal settlements of land in the outskirts of Honiara City, (squatter settlements had grown up and extended into customary land areas of the indigenous owners), a desire for more autonomy through state government and a host of other grievances. A small renegade faction, led by notorious Harold Keke still exists despite peace efforts to have the violence and fighting stopped. This group and their members deliberately broke the laws of this country and yet were not arrested and brought to account in the People’s Courts. A lot of people from Malaita and others, living in the outskirts of Honiara City, many two or three generations and had validly purchased land in custom or according to law (pursuant to Land and Title Act Cap.133), peacefully and lawfully residing in their lands, suddenly found themselves chased out by armed and ruthless gangs who showed no respect for the law. There was indiscriminate burning, destruction of property, kidnapping and killing of innocent Malaitans. Law and order outside of Honiara city was virtually out of control. The Police with due respect were unable or prevented from taking control of the law and order situation outside of the city boundary. Had the armed rebellion and upheaval, which started off as criminal activities been nipped at the bud, the storm may never have been allowed to gather momentum and turn into a hurricane which almost destroyed the foundations of this nation. The Government of the day too seemed powerless, despite its many well meaning efforts and attempts to halt the lawlessness that was wreaking havoc outside the city boundary and pushing its ugly head in towards Honiara City. Progress to halt or arrest this downward spiral of lawlessness was slow, too slow perhaps for the victims and those directly affected. Many had lost their life’s savings and investments overnight. For some it was a simple matter of life and death to escape. Delay would have been fatal. Many were traumatised and hurt by what appears to be insane and unimaginable atrocities and crimes, tortures and killings committee against them. Many lost their loved ones. Many were innocent victims of this incomprehensible hatred and anger directed at them under the guise of “ethnic cleansing”. There were obviously many disaffected people, especially from the thousands that had been unlawfully chased out and displaced by the armed rebellion There were many hurt and wounded, angry and offended people. For many who have been abased, abused and debased, revenge and retribution was high on their list. Their patience was running out. Confusion and uncertainty was ripe. The politically oriented obviously took advantage of the situation to advance their political agendas. The stage was set for the volcano to explode and it did on 5th June 2000.

A coup, any coup, which results in the overthrow of an elected government is political in nature and the decision to stage it is, undoubtedly, political. But as the learned Acting Chief Justice rightly observed, the background history makes the eruption of the volcano a likely consequence. John M.Tuhaika, PS of the Ministry of Provincial Government & Rural Development, in his article “Federal/State Government and its impact on Rural Development” was correct when he said “It all boiled over on 5th June 2000 in a civilian coup.”

Surely, soon after the successful staging of the coup many aspiring politicians both in the Parliamentary Opposition and on the SIAC bench saw opportunities for an easy harvest. I know of steps being taken by politicians to use the incident to gain political leverage in the parliamentary power struggle. However, it was not true to assert that the primary purpose of the coup was to put the opposition in office.

Costly Delays

My original desire was for the political crisis to be resolved within fourteen days, by which time Parliament would have been convened, a motion of confidence or no confidence debated and a new government sworn into office – whether a SIAC led, a government of national unity or an Opposition led coalition. Resolving the political dispute was critical to the return of law and order and the fast tracking of the peace process. By then I had already planned to meet with Henry Tobani, the spokesman for the IFM, to see whether a ceasefire discussion could be entered into, giving way for a full peace negotiation later soon after a new government took office. My first meeting with Tobani eventually took place outside Alligator Creek on 13th June, 2000 aboard an Australian Navy landing craft.

Resolution of the political crisis was delayed by the postponement of the meeting of Parliament from 18th June 2000 to 28 June and later to 30 June 2000. During the intervening two weeks Ulufa’alu was still fighting back in the media as though he still had some hope of surviving the aftermath of the coup. I then knew that here was one person who was willing to go to extreme lengths to remain in power. I admired him for that stamina. His media statements, however, basically made the Joint Operation angry. Many of them then decided that the man must not be returned as prime minister then or in the future.

Worsening law and order situation

During the three weeks following the coup a chain of events occurred which very seriously led to the worsened law and order situation in Honiara. In the Western Province a quasi-militant group called the “Black Sharks” emerged. The formation of this group was encouraged by the Western Provincial Government, together with some prominent businessmen in Gizo and in the Noro/Munda area. According to the official provincial government position the Black Shark, which was joined later by criminals and mercenaries from South Bougainville, was formed to provide security for the people of Western Province from any imminent attacks by the MEF. They had reason to fear: During the preceding five weeks the people in the Western Province, especially in the Gizo, Kolombangara, Noro and Munda triangle embarked on silly acts of harassment, chase and eviction against innocent Malaitans in the area which were wholly unjustifiable. The result of these unlawful activities was that more than 500 Malaitans flocked into Honiara from the Western Province and started joining the camps of the MEF in and around Honiara. This was when many innocent people from Western and Choiseul Provinces were harassed and threatened by members of the MEF, now joined by many young men unlawfully chased out from Gizo and Noro. Law and order in Honiara then became uncontrollable, despite meagre efforts by the MEF/Joint Operation’s so-called ‘military police’ or MPs - most of whose members were ex-criminals themselves.

The fear of MEF invasion of Western Province lacked any logistical or political merits. It was the long-harboured hate of Malaitans by some individuals in the Province that was coming to the surface. During the period after 5th June, 2000 members of the Black Shark even stopped the circulation of the Solomon Star Newspaper in Gizo, Munda and Noro because it was carrying photographs of MEF soldiers in action and because was owned by a Malaitan.

Laying the blame

The events of and subsequent to 5th June 2000 have often been taken in isolation resulting in the generalised accusations that the MEF were responsible for-

(a) “the destruction of the Solomon Islands nation” (see John Roughan, “A Time of Uncertainty”, ABC Website);

(b) the current suppressed state of the economy; and

Destruction of the Solomon Islands state

The destruction of the Solomon Islands nation started when the people of Guadalcanal decided to take up arms to evict their fellow citizens of Malaita from their province. There could not have been any other outcome of such heinous, brutal and terrorist activities organised and supported at the highest political level of the Guadalcanal Provincial leadership. It was an act of war against the people of Malaita. War destroys and severs human relationships and destroys nations. Ethnic cleansing is a destructive force any where in the world. Anyone who is narrow minded enough to blame the events of 5th June 2000, as being the starting point for the destruction of the Solomon Island state is to elevate the interest of Ulufa’alu and SIAC above the interests of the 22,000 Malaitans who were victims of Solomon Islands worst act of terrorism.

[In response to these comments John Roughan said that “…at not time did the IFM in all its permutations, e.g. GRA, etc threaten the very existence of the state or take over the running of the state apparatus. This dubious distinction remains the prerogative of the MEF.” This statement underscores the ignorance on the part of many well meaning non-indigenous Solomon islanders to fully come to terms with what makes the Solomon Islands state ticks. It elevates the institutional compositions of the state above the cohesiveness of its people. The state is not destroyed just by removing its elected government - whether induced by revolutionary or democratic means. But you remove the unity, the mutual co-existence and the cohesiveness of its people and the state ceases to exist or withers away. That was exactly what the GRA/IFM terrorists did during the course of 1998 and 1999.

The MEF did not take over the running of the ‘state apparatus’. In less than 30 days from 5th June 2000 the running of the day-to-day affairs of the state reverted back to a Parliamentary elected government. This was because the Governor General, as the result of the consultations I referred to earlier, using powers vested in him under the constitution, took responsibility for state affairs. After 5th June 2000 the national constitution was not abrogated. It remained in force, operational and effective.]

The Economy

The closure of Gold Ridge and SIPL are said to have had and are still having very serious effects on the economy. This is true but look - who closed these operations? It was the IFM, not the MEF. The Solomon Tayio operation in the Western Province was closed (now re-opened) as the result of criminal activities of the “Black Sharks”, a copycat militant group formed in the Noro/Munda area by some mixed-race idiots who brought in ex-BRA criminals to the Western Province and paid for by the Western Provincial Government (using SIG funds).

Honiara, which was taken over by the MEF on 5th June, 2000 is back in business. There are certainly cases where output is not as high as the pre-coup period but, overall things are picking up. The retail industry is flourishing with the curtesy of the property compensation payments. Having said this, it cannot be denied that many business operators remain uncertain and are taking things slowly and cautiously.

Law and Order

Law and order in Honiara was at its worst during the three weeks before 5th June 2000. Things worsened after 5th June 2000 but after the signing of the TPA, combined with serious efforts by the Police, things are returning to normal. Of course with weapons still out there in the hands of ex-militants there is certainly a perceived sense of insecurity in the community. This is an issue, which must continue to be addressed by the Peace Monitoring Council and the parties to the Townsville Peace Agreement, in particular the Police. However, one needs to understand that Harold Keke, the man who started the uprising on Guadalcanal resulting in the deaths of many Malaitans is still roaming freely on Guadacanal, is heavily armed and does not want to be part of the current peace initiatives. How does one expect the former members of the MEF to fully disarm when those who first took up arms are still out there, going around with high-powered weapons as though the war is still on? It appears that when weapons are in the hands of the MEF they cause concern to the public – when weapons are in the hands of the IFM or the Black Shark they do not. IFM and Keke are the real perpetrators of the ethnic crisis in Solomon Islands. The public seemed to have forgotten about their past atrocities against Malaita people but are not willing to forget about what took place on 5th June 2000. It is the anti Malaita phobia again! They said nothing before 5th June 2000 because their empires remained intact then. It was after June 2000 that their comfort zones started shaking. To them that was when the crisis started – not before!

One thing I learned from the recent ethnic conflict – if Malaita is separated from the rest of Solomon Islands, there will be little tears in the eyes of other provinces.

Why the Coup

To answer this question I may only say that-

(a) the coup occurred because Ulufa’alu and his government - for reasons of political survival - did nothing constructive to halt the atrocities and criminal activities of the GRA/IFM targeted at Malaitans which resulted in the deaths of 28 innocent Malaitans;

(b) the SIAC led administration failed to properly and tactfully address property claims as priority, instead it adopted the misconceived policy of “peace before justice” while the victims believed that justice must come before peace;

(c) the failure by the Police to dislodge the GRA/IFM earlier in the crisis made retaliation and revenge by the MEF and their Malaita supporters inevitable – Ulufa’alu being included as a target for retaliation; and

(d) the MEF and many Malaitans believed that if Ulufa’alu remained in office and continued to adopt his arrogant position, claims for redress would not be addressed. This could have led to the protraction of the conflict with an all-out civil war becoming inevitable.

Whether these reasons are to be believed or not is for future historians to assess. But less than two months after the ouster of Ulufa’alu from office a ceasefire agreement was signed between MEF and IFM. Less than five months later a peace agreement was signed in Townsville, resulting in cessation of hostilities. Of course, much is yet to be done before Solomon Islands returns to full normalcy but at least we know where we are going. We have just held a fair and free election (according to the findings of the International Observer Team) and a new government (democratically installed) has taken office last week that, going by their leader’s promises, is eager to place our nation on a firm road to economic recovery. As for the rest, LET US WAIT AND SEE.

Installing a new government

There have been allegations and allusions made (John Roughan amongst them) that the coup was aimed, mainly, at installing Dausabea and Sogavare into government. There is no truth to these statements and allegations. Dausabea might have used some criminal members of the MEF to rally support for the opposition during the period leading to the election of the PM on 30/6/00 but, to my knowledge, MEF was not party to such activities. In fact documents submitted to the High Court as part of the case referred to herein (not challenged by Ulufa’alu and his witnesses) show that the Joint Operation which consisted of MEF and the paramilitary forces, had preferred Rev. Boseto as PM.

The Peace Process

The fact that the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) brought about cessation of bloody hostilities could not be denied by anyone. In that sense it served its purpose. Recent attacks on the TPA by interest groups in Solomon Islands deserve some comments. These attacks fall into three categories:

(1) Absence of Civil Society and other stake-holders

Civil society groups insisted that one of the failures of the TPA was the absence from the negotiations of civil society leaders. They had wanted to involve in the actual negotiations but were not allowed to. I must say that I find it hard to understand the rationale behind this complaint. No war agreements anywhere in the world ever included, in the actual negotiations, members of the civil society who are duly represented by their elected government.

The TPA is not for the civil society – it was an agreement between the waring parties and the government as the facilitator and as guardian of the law.

The ordinary civilian population may of course assist in the various stages of the peace process if they desire to.

(2) Truth and Justice

A further complaint is that the TPA did not provide for truth and justice to be achieved – considering the amnesty provisions. But the TPA was not about truth or justice. It was not a report of a commission of inquiry or a tribunal investigating into issues of truth or justice. It was a war agreement that primarily provides for stoppage to fighting. The two militant groups agreed to stop fighting on the condition that their members are granted amnesty.

Any Solomon Islanders who seek after truth or justice should make use of the provisions of the Commission of Inquiry Act [Cap.5] or the Death and Fire Inquiries Act ([Cap.9], both of which allow for inquiries and investigations into issues of public interest and into suspicious deaths etc.

Truth and justice are virtues that are safely guarded by Solomon Islands law. There are current statutory mechanisms available for anyone seeking truth and justice. The TPA does not remove the effects and availability of those statutory mechanisms.

(3) Compensation

Critics of the TPA blame the parties for the excessive costs incurred by the SIG on compensation demands. This, they say, is one reason why the nations economic and financial crisis cannot be resolved.

The TPA does not obligate the SIG to pay compensation for lost property, injuries or damages. What it requires is for the SIG to find assistance from foreign aid donors towards meeting the demands. No formula is stated in the agreement for compensation claims.

The current mad-rash for claims and the disorganised manner in which the claims were paid or promised to be paid was the mistake of the outgoing government, in particular Hon Allan Kemakesa (now Sir Alan), then minister responsible. Immediately after returning from Townsville he set out to pay claims which were yet to be properly verified or assessed. He set a standard amount of $50,000 for each claim for injury. Upon re-checking some of the injury claims it was discovered that these injuries could not be worth more than $1,000 if assessed using the formula under the Workmen’s Compensation Act or even if duly assessed by a court. These were human mistakes that could not be blamed on the TPA.

The Review of TPA

On 10th September 2001 a golden opportunity presented itself for the parties to the TPA to review implementation issues. Many useful comments were emerging and there was a general consensus that there were room for improvements at both logistical and implementation levels. This worthwhile exercise was derailed when a former commander of the GRA/IFM was kidnapped at his home on Guadalcanal Plains and found dead at Mt. Austin near Honiara. Representatives of the IFM at the review talks exited the meeting and said they would not participate in future talks until those responsible for the murder of their former comrade were arrested and brought to justice. I had hoped that the IFM would have imposed a less difficult condition for their future participation. It is important that the review exercise resumes urgently.

As I write this paper I hear that there were near-fatal shootings at Kakabona over the weekend of three boys from Malaita. It is also being reported that former IFM militants burnt eleven houses on the weather coast of Guadalcanal in what appeared to be a revenge action. Just a few minutes ago gunshots were fired not far from where I am writing, prompting me to ring the police toll-free number, just to be told that they had no vehicles.

So the peace process is being threatened from all directions. There is need for continued involvement of leaders from all walks of life in the process in order to ensure that life returns to normal.

I have dedicated the past 18 months to assisting in preventing the total collapse of our nation. In the process I have tarnished my integrity, image and, sadly, have lost many precious friends. I am not giving up. I have just contacted the Peace Monitoring Council to link me with Harold Keke, hoping to encourage him to enter the peace process. The surrender of the 35 or more high-powered weapons in his possession is critical to full disarmament. If this effort fails we have to live with the guns for a long time because the former MEF members still holding on to weapons will not surrender them for the reason already explained.

Legal fees

I cannot end without addressing the questions raised about fees charged by my law firm for services rendered during the post coup period and for negotiations of the peace agreements. As I stated, on 5th June 2000 I demanded from the coup leaders that my terms of engagement be put in writing before I could proceed to do anything. This included the term for my legal assistance.

Between 5th June 2000 and 12 February 2001 I spent hours on plotting the legal path for the ceasefire agreement, the Townsville Peace Agreement and the Marau Peace Agreement. Let me say that 90% of the work associated with the preparation and engrossing of these documents was done by me personally. I literally put nearly ten hours every day (except Saturdays) attending to matters to do with these peace agreements, including holding meetings, writing papers, providing legal advice on constitutional and other legal issues and actually drawing up draft agreements and attending ceasefire and peace negotiations both locally and overseas. For the ceasefire agreement I produced 5 drafts, for the TPA I produced 6 drafts and for the Marau Peace Agreement I produced 3 drafts – each draft being preceded by lengthy consultations and briefings with clients, who are militants, with hurtful view points to negotiate and document.

To put my scale of fees in perspective let us take an example of what private practitioners charge in Solomon Islands. A few years ago a law firm in Honiara was asked to and did draw up the share transfer agreement for the purchase of shares in Solomon Telekom Limited by the National Provident Fund. The firm charged more than $400,000 for the work. Scale of fees range from $1,200 per hour at the top to $200 at the bottom.

In Honiara I am the most senior Solomon Islander in private legal practice. My scale of fee is $900 (USD180) or per hour which is the third highest in the country. I keep an accurate timesheet to clock the hours I worked. This is required of legal practitioners. The fees I charged were based on these time computation, which was 90 days X 9 hours (per day) X USD180 = USD145,800. This is the amount described as excessive by many of my critics. I believe that if my body was white and I charged the same fees no one would have raised an eyebrow. But I am an indigenous Solomon Islander who is not expected to provide quality legal service and, therefore, should not charge high fees.

I did not tender my fees to the SIG. My invoices were tendered to the Joint Operations, my clients. The Government agreed to pay for my fees since they legally fell within the cost clause of the TPA.

I personally feel that I deserved to be paid for my professional services. Why should I work free for a nation that has elected politicians and church leaders who are on the public pay roll and yet failed to solve the ethnic crisis in time? I was not born to serve this country free! I have a family to look after.

Caveat

Anyone reading these pages is warned that you are not obliged to believe the accounts presented herein. Solomon Islanders living both within and without are at liberty to choose who and what they should believe. My views are personal and are based on what I know from within. Because of my close association with the MEF and Joint Operation as legal adviser and chief negotiator my views are far from independent or neutral. As you know, very few people in this county are neutral when it comes to discussing the current crisis, so as to give an independent and accurate story on what took place last year and the motives behind those events.

A Book?

I have been asked to write a book and I am considering doing just that. The question, really, is who will benefit from such a document. Our country needs time to heal itself from the sad events of the past and any publication that seeks only to remind us of the miseries of the past three years should be left in abeyance until much later.

Andrew G H Nori
December, 2001

It's not Money, but Trust!

by Dr. John Roughan