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The Dollar Rules!
By Dr. John Roughan
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Our politicians are
currently bowing down to the almighty dollar as they have never done
in the past. Poison from Taiwan is coming to the Solomons because
the nation desperately needs money. Disease, pollution, dirty and
deadly things are coming to our country because we need the almighty
dollar. We willingly import death to our own people to get our hands
on the almighty dollar.
Last week our elected leaders, Cabinet members of Solomon Islands
government, sworn to up hold the nation's constitution, to defend
the country, are determined to import rubbish which will kill our
people, make them sick all because we need money. When the cabinet
minister was reminded that the technical papers written by experts
show that what we would get is poison, death and sickness, the response
was "Leave the studies first time! We'll import the toxic waste
and worry about the future behind!"
The nation's highest officials have now given a completely new meaning
to the word development. It's acceptable into their terms to poison
land, contaminate water, destroy reef and destroy life so long as
one promises the villagers who will be destroyed schools, clinics,
roads and jobs behind. The nation, through its misguided thinking
to import toxic waste, has become the laughing stock of the Pacific
and a warning flag has been raised for donor friends and reduce investor
confidence.
No longer do we hear the excuse that this Taiwanese waste is 'humus'--enriching
top soil, good for logged out areas. No it's now admitted that the
stuff that a Taiwanese company (which has really been out of business
since February) will be sending is seriously toxic and quite able
to bring sickness to the ground, the waters and the reefs, and disease
to our people for many years to come. The real reason for the cabinet
decision is clear. The government is so bankrupt, morally, financially
and culturally, that it will make any kind of a deal, so long as the
nation would get money for it. I notice, however, that the toxic waste
will be dumped in someone else's backyard far away from the 'important'
people.
Notice, the toxic waste is going to be dumped on Makira's Weather
Coast, far enough away from those who are making this bleak decision
that it won't hurt them or their families. If these cabinet ministers
are so concerned with money, then let the poisonous waste be dumped
in their own village, close to their own families and with their own
wontoks first. Then with time to study what happens over many years,
the rest of the Solomons can make a decision to import the waste or
not.
One thing is sure. Toxic wastes worldwide will not go away soon--the
whole world has been trying to get rid of its toxic wastes for years--so
even if our country has to wait five to ten years, the poisonous waste
will still be waiting for us to import. Why? Because if the waste
wasn't so bad for human beings why doesn't Taiwan keep it in their
own backyard rather than paying big dollars to ship the stuff 6,000
miles to another country and have that country, Solomon Islands in
this case, be paid to have it dumped here. Why aren't other countries
in the Pacific--Narau, Vanuatu, PNG--lining up to accept this rubbish
if it was such a good deal. These same countries also need to build
up their destroyed forests. Do they know something we are refusing
to accept because we are in bankrupt mode?
Dr. Morgan Wairiu, the Permanent Secretary for the Ministry of Agriculture,
is the only one that comes out of this whole mess still smelling like
a rose. All the others, especially the ministers, smell awful. He
has fought the cabinet's decision, quietly at first which is the way
of the Public Servant, and then when his political masters stopped
up their ears, he went public. Unfortunately, he won't be long with
us. The present government will find it hard to keep an outspoken,
knowledgeable and straight speaker in the same boat as those who are
secretive, uncaring and devious. Good on you, Morgan and may there
be many more Public Servants of the same calibre. Perhaps then the
Solomons will get back its dignity. |
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THE TRUTH IS CRITICAL TO LASTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION
IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS
By Frank Short, CBE
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| The
U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, released
by the Bureau of Democracy, and Human Rights, and Labor are important
internationally circulated documents that expose injustices and help
in establishing democratic values, social justice and fundamental
human rights in countries throughout the world.
Valuing such annual reports highly for their accuracy, I was shocked
when reading the U.S. State Department Country Report on the Solomon
Islands dated March 4, 2002, (which was included in the Pacific
Islands Report on March 27, 2002), [SEE: U.S. Department of State:
Solomon Islands: Human Rights Report at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eap/8376.htm]
by a reference which read, "In 1998 and 1999, when the Police
were battling the Guadalcanese militants, police officers were involved
in extrajudicial killings and unwarranted use of lethal force against
civilians." I believe this statement needs to be clarified
for not only is it untrue, but it contradicts the information published
in the previous U.S. Department of State Country Report on the Solomon
Islands, dated February 26, 1999, when it was stated "there
were no reports of political or extrajudicial killings" (in1998).
At a time when accurate reporting is vital to the efforts to promote
healing and reconciliation in the Solomons, I therefore consider
the latest U.S. report should be corrected.
I was the Commissioner of Police in the Solomon Islands when the
so-called ethnic troubles first began in September 1998 and I remained
in charge of the Police until July 1999, when I left after declining
another two -year contract. I have first hand knowledge of the events
from September 1998 until my departure and I believe it is timely
and important to set the record straight.
During the early hours of December 9, 1998, when I was in New Zealand
attending a meeting, a party of men with their faces partially covered,
mounted a commando style raid on the remote Yandina Police Station
after arriving in canoes during darkness. They attacked and held
the unsuspecting lone Sergeant captive while they forced open the
armory and stole several rifles and ammunition. The police officer,
although injured and shaken during the incident, later managed to
contact his local headquarters and report the matter. The raiders
had escaped, however, by the time a police party could be mustered
and both the men and the stolen firearms were not found in the following
days despite an intensive search.
It was some three weeks later, on December 30, 1998, when I received
a report from one of my senior officers that five armed men, some
dressed in military style uniform, had allegedly stolen a power
boat from the Tambea Beach Resort and, after beaching the craft
on Bungana Island following a suspected mechanical failure, they
had been challenged by members of a police party from the Central
Islands Police Headquarters at Tulagi, who had gone to the scene
following a tip-off. Shots were reported to have been fired at the
policemen after they had identified themselves and a Constable was
hit in the face. Further shots had then occurred and one of the
men, later identified as Ishmael Panda, fell from a tree where he
had concealed himself. He was found to have suffered a chest wound
and died soon afterwards. Another of the men, identified as Harold
Keke, received a flesh wound to his head and was given first aid
by the policemen at the scene. While receiving this treatment, he
allegedly said to the police officer aiding him that he was "sorry"
and claimed "Alebua told us to do this."
The deceased, Keke and the other arrested persons, including Joseph
Sangu, were conveyed to Honiara and held in custody while the body
of Ishmael Panda was removed to the hospital mortuary. Keke was
later admitted to the hospital for a short while for treatment but
kept under constant police guard. The firearms recovered from the
prisoners captured on Bungana Island were found to include those
allegedly stolen from the Yandina Police Station. During his time
in custody, Joseph Sangu actually wrote a note, which he gave to
a prison officer. In the note, Sangu called on those involved in
the "struggle" to stop their activities as it (the "struggle")
was over. I seem to recall that the Solomon Islands Broadcasting
Station may have broadcast the contents of the note at Sangu's request.
The shooting of Ishmael Panda was initially communicated to me
as having occurred during an exchange of fire on the beach near
the abandoned power boat and my concern was doubly aroused when
I discovered that he had been shot while concealed in a tree. I
ordered an immediate inquiry and instructed Senior Superintendent
Hosking, a British officer with previous military and firearms experience,
to undertake the work. He quickly reported back to me and, based
on his initial findings, I requested, through the Government, the
assistance of the New Zealand Police to further the investigations.
Two senior New Zealand Police officers very soon afterwards began
a skilled and detailed inquiry into Ishmael Panda's death, aided
by forensic work conducted by the Australian Federal Police. Their
combined investigations led to the early arrest of a police officer
that I had placed under suspension for misconduct some weeks before.
This Constable had managed to join the police party when leaving
Tulagi for Bungana Island, despite having been seen by his Commander
and who knew he was officially suspended from all police duties.
The Constable was subsequently charged with the murder of Panda
and later convicted and sentenced. His Commander was also severely
disciplined by myself. The unlawful killing by the policeman was
the only death of a civilian attributed to the police in 1998 and
the only case in which a police officer has been investigated, to
the best of my knowledge, for human rights abuses since the tragic
events unfolded in the Solomon Islands until the present time.
My handling of the Bungana Inquiry was criticized in the Solomons
at the time and I think the general feeling was that I would not
allow an independent and thorough investigation. My decision to
call in the New Zealand and Australian Police was not influenced
by such criticism for I was determined that there would be transparency
and the final report given to me by the investigators vindicated
my actions by stating that all the documents seen by the detectives
in an endeavor to assimilate and understand aspects of Royal Solomon
Islands Police Policy, Practice and Procedures, "clearly and
succinctly confirms the Commissioner's determination to ensure the
use of minimum force when dealing with incidents." Referring
to my Policy Outline, the final report read, "The Commissioner
has a particular vision and commitment to ensuring accountability
in the Police Service, equally the Commissioner espouses the principle
of fairness and equity of a commitment to human rights."
The prisoners detained after their arrest on Bungana Island were
facing serious charges, including attempted murder and two counts
of armed robbery, but despite a plea by the Police Prosecutor, the
accused, including Keke and Sangu, were released by the Chief Magistrate
on bail put up by Premier Alebua, the leader of Guadalcanal Province
and by a Catholic priest. The accused immediately absconded to the
remote areas of the Weathercoast and intensified the campaign. Repeated
efforts to re-capture the escapees failed due to the difficulty
in reaching the locations where they had been reported, but also
by a lack of transport, poor equipment and communications and, it
was suspected, by the deliberate leaking of police operational information
and intelligence.
Responding to the many serious hit and run incidents on Guadalcanal
following the release of the prisoners, the police patrols often
came on the scene too late because of the time it took to reach
their destination, but also because the policemen found themselves
in territory where their vehicles were ambushed and exposed to armed
attack. To make matters worse the police investigators were handicapped
by a reluctance by witnesses to give information for fear of reprisals
and by intimidation.
After the Bungana incident, I issued further orders to ensure compliance
with international norms on the use of firearms was being observed,
but I had previously recorded: "The members of the Solomon
Islands Police should be able to carry out their duties without
having to resort to force. Conflict resolution skills must be learned
for resolving all types of conflicts. We must be committed to the
use of minimum force when dealing with incidents. The members of
the service must, therefore, have access to training and equipment,
which obviate the need for force to resolve problems. Any laws and
police regulations, which act contrary to the use of minimum force,
should be amended to bring them in line with international standards.
Although the members of the police service will still need to be
issued with adequate equipment to protect them in dangerous situations,
they must only be issued with weapons which are appropriate to the
situation they are likely to encounter."
Police officers were therefore under strict orders to comply with
my standing orders on the use of firearms and arms could only to
be issued and carried in special circumstances. When police patrols
were regularly being ambushed and their unprotected vehicles and
unprotected personnel came under armed attack, I gave permission
for some firearms to be carried, but concealed. As the intensity
of armed attacks on the Malaitan community increased so did the
number of incidents in which the police found themselves the target
of roadside shootings from persons hiding in the surrounding thick
bush. In some instances the police returned the fire in order to
protect themselves but no reports of fatalities were reported as
a result of police action after the Bungana incident prior to my
leaving the Solomons.
One article in the Solomon Star contributed by a member of the
public and published in the edition of the paper dated July 28 1999
commented: "Throughout the national ordeal the only incident
that the police can perhaps be faulted for was the one killing that
took place on Bungana Island during the early stages of the national
crisis. Other than that, in all the confrontations that they have
had with members of the GRA and other law-breakers, the police have
maintained a gentle and dignified composure avoiding retaliation
and focusing exclusively on peace and social stability as their
primary responsibility. Undoubtedly, only a police force guided
by strong leadership and the true spirit of mutual respect and trust
can uphold such a level of professionalism in the face of unprecedented
lawlessness."
The unsolicited comment after I had left office lends support to
my belief that the police were not involved knowingly in any extrajudicial
killing of civilians during my period in charge other than the tragic
shooting of Ishmael Panda and for which the culprit was brought
to justice and punished. The police, on the other hand, despite
having available superior firepower behaved, on the whole, with
considerable constraint while risking life and limb to try and protect
the innocent victims of the ethnic troubles and investigate the
many incidents.
I supported all the Government's efforts to bring about a peace
settlement and advised the Prime Minister to seek the assistance
of the Commonwealth in an attempt to broker a peaceful outcome to
the conflict which had seen the displacement of many Malaitan plantation
workers and their families, savage brutality and property damage.
I have been horrified and deeply saddened since leaving the Solomons
by the deaths of so many Solomon Islanders and by the mistrust and
bitterness that has created enmity between brothers; an enmity that
has now developed into lawlessness and where communities in Honiara
and other provincial centers such as in Auki and Gizo are threatened
by armed persons still holding on to their illegally acquired high-
powered firearms.
The present Government's bid to have all stolen weapons surrendered
during the first hundred days of office has not been met and the
closing date for the surrendering of the illegal weapons and stolen
property has been further extended to the end of May this year.
This is the third time that an extension of the date to surrender
the weapons has been given.
I believe that, ultimately, there must be true reconciliation in
the Solomons to resolve what has taken place during the past few
years, but I also believe that reconciliation and a lasting peace
can only come about when the truth about the formation of the GRA/IFM
is known and when the members of the MEF, the Black Sharks and Keke
and his supporters disarm. Keke has been reported to allegedly posses
a number of high-powered American weapons that he imported illegally
and he continues to figure in the news as allegedly being behind
several major incidents, including it was claimed an attempted assassination
on Alebua. Until Keke fully commits himself to the terms of a peace
settlement and hands over all his weapons and ammunition, it is
not realistic to think that the MEF or others will do the same.
In a widely circulated paper entitled " 5th June 2000 in Perspective"
Andrew Nori the self-styled Malaita Eagle Force spokesperson and
prominent Honiara based lawyer claimed, in part of his paper, that
in mid July 1998 a meeting was held at Tambea Resort, west Guadalcanal,
at which several key Guadalcanal leaders were present and participated.
These included Alebua, two Guadalcanal Police officers, Sethuel
Kelly and many young men, including Harold Keke and Joseph Sangu.
He went on to allege that "a decision was made then to forcefully
evict Malaitans from Guadalcanal. Not long afterwards, armed men
raided the Yandina Police armory. The GRA was born and the burning,
looting, raping, chasing and murdering started."
Mr. Nori is an experienced lawyer, an ex-President of the Solomon
Islands Bar, and one who is well aware of the law of defamation.
By publishing the names of those he claims were involved in the
birth of the GRA, he must have calculated the risks he would face
by possible legal proceedings. The information he has released must
therefore be considered worthy of investigation by the authorities,
particularly in the light of recent calls by the Acting Chief Justice
in the Solomons, the Honorable Justice Palmer, who called for such
an inquiry.
The urgency for national unity and peace cannot be ignored and
neither can the victims of violence be forgotten. Gross violations
of human rights have occurred in the Solomons in recent times and
this has resulted in a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge.
These issues should now be addressed on the basis that there is
a need for understanding and the truth, but not for vengeance or
further victimization.
The democratically elected Government must be encouraged to promote
the building up of a human rights culture in the Solomons and the
means must be found, and soon, to complete a picture of the causes,
nature and extent of gross violations of human rights which were
committed in the period from September 1998 until the present time.
Only when this is done will true reconciliation in a spirit of understanding
which transcends the conflict and ethnic divisions be achieved.
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Different Car but the Same Driver!
By
Dr. John Roughan
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A
bad, really bad driver of an old and beaten up car can be given a
brand new one. But no matter how shiny, up-to-date the new car is,
the bad driver remains a poor driver. He doesn't have the necessary
skills to drive properly. It's not the fault of the car that he is
always in accidents. The poor driver will probably destroy any new
car given in a very short time because the trouble is not with the
car but with the driver. So to have a safe driving both the car and
the driver have to be renewed.
This week members of parliament will be discussing the ins and outs
of a State System of government to replace the 1978 Provincial system.
People across the nation want finish the Provincial system because
it has failed them so miserably. Over the last 24 years the provincial
system has been terribly weak. It didn't deliver sound schooling,
it has been poor in supplying basic health services, in a word the
provincial system has been miserable in delivering basic services
to Solomons' people.
Citizens all over the nation are desperate. They know how badly government
services have failed them for more than two decades and are hungry
to have their modest needs of proper schooling, decent health care
and chances of making a few shillings finally fulfilled. The fundamental
reason for our three years of Social Unrest is directly linked to
the poor servicing of village people for more than twenty years. If
a State System of government will do the job, they are all for it.
They would even accept a dictatorship if it did the work well. Villagers
are not worried about the label. They simply want results.
What villagers and town folk are saying is: government you are suppose
to be our servants, not our masters. Please act like servants and
stop playing the Big Master. There is nothing really wrong with the
Provincial system had politicians, bureaucrats and public servants
half done their job. But what they got was a Provincial System that
served the Big Masters and lip-serviced people and their needs.
Any new system, on its own, won't guarantee the people will be served.
It's like the bad driver mentioned at the beginning. Simply giving
a bad driver a new car does not guarantee anything but the same accidents
happening over again and over again. The old system--Provincial System--was
run by men (mostly men, few women) for men and about men's business.
Now these same men--Parliamentarians--are talking about a new system
called a State System. Unfortunately those that ruined the old system
now tell us the new system is the answer.
But their track record already makes this boast doubtful. For instance,
over the last few months, the Kongulai people who own Honiara's water
supply, haven't been paid their quarterly payment. Because of that
breech, villagers have cut off Honiara's water once again. Honiara's
people--mothers with kids, schools, families, health, sanitation,
etc. etc.--have to take the brunt of government's inability to do
first things first. Kongulai villagers were owed $200,000 which couldn't
be found but the week previously more than $8 million was paid out
to militants who showed muscle. Such ineptness is bound to continue
no matter what the new system is called: Provincial, State, Dictatorship,
etc.
It's the human factor that must change, be corrected and brought up
to date. Simply changing the label from a Provincial to a State system
is not where the action is. Link parliamentarians actual work in office
to determine whether the member stays in power. It's called a REFERENDUM!
When a parliamentarian reaches the half way point in his four year
term, if he isn't measuring up. if he isn't servicing his area, then
his people can demand that he face a mid-term election. Linking parliamentarian
involvement in a new State System can go a long way to guarantee its
success.
A number of states already have this provision in their laws and it
has the added beauty of keeping elected members focused on those that
put them in office. Too often in the Solomons, once a member is elected
then he sits back and coasts for the next four years. Villagers and
town people should have a powerful tool to make sure their member
acts on their behalf or face an aroused electorate once again. As
was said in the very beginning, it is not enough to change the car
but the driver too must be up-graded.
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Struggling
for the Better Life
By
Dr. John Roughan
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Solomons'
village women have rarely experienced, first hand, what it means to
enjoy the Better Life--healthier, more productive and, especially
an easier and satisfying one. At times they glimpse it from afar .
. . a trip to Honiara to see how the other 'half' live. Village life,
on the other hand, is terribly physical. Food production remains laborious,
house construction and repair is hard and time consuming, social obligations
(church, school, community calls) grow daily and one's limited economic
life--small business work, income generating attempts--demands grow
more and more acute but there's less and less time, fewer resources
or necessary skills available to gain even modest amounts of money.
At independence In 1978 there was great expectation that, now that
their own people were finally in charge of the country, the nation's
resources would finally fund the basics of the Better Life. The services
of education, medical attention, enhancement of people's resource
base and new ways to secure modest amounts of money to buy the few
luxury items they would allow themselves, e.g. matches, soap, kerosene,
colorful clothing, store bought food, etc. etc., would finally be
part of their normal life patterns.
During the 'Golden Era' years (1978-1985), commodity prices although
slowly in decline remained healthy. Education opportunities in primary
grew but secondary entry in percentage terms was seriously eroding.
Tertiary education opportunities, however, increased--both at SICHE
and overseas universities.
Rural clinic presence although seen as the front line of health defence
were less and less able to attract the necessary funds. Central Hospital
and Honiara in general absorbed the bulk of medical resources. Other
social services--adequate transport, entertainment opportunities,
communication links, sports' facilities--were lipserviced for the
rural areas but fundamentally centered in Honiara and in minor ways,
the provincial capitals.
1986's Cyclone Namu marked the obvious decay of the state's involvement
with the bulk of its citizens. In the previous 8 years following independence,
the State was finding it more and more difficult to service its people.
Politicians, especially parliamentarians, emphasised their own well
being at the expense of the village sector. Their game plan was a
version of the Trickle Down Theory. If they, the Honiara Elite, did
well then that same well being would percolate down to the whole a
little bit like Ronald Reagan's famous analogy of the ocean's high
tide raising all ships equally--the luxury cruiser, small ship, outboard
canoe, paddle canoe, etc.
By 1989, the Solomons had entered onto its 'Leaden Age' rather than
all ships rising on the high tide, the village canoe and many of its
outboard canoes actually began to sink. In fact, by 1997, the quality
of village life especially for women, became harder, less rewarding,
poorer and less and less healthy compared to their recent expectations.
But the gap between the country's elite, mostly in Honiara, and the
impoverished villager grew at an alarming rate.
In 1978, for instance, I was able to count but one millionaire among
Solomon Islanders . . . those with assets worth a million dollars:
Honiara houses, businesses owned, vehicles driven. By 1998, however,
my list of local millionaires had risen dramatically, more than 20
using the 1978 criteria and all without exception had been in government
at the highest levels.
The present UN study calls for a 'people-centered' development when
the Solomons already has been crying out for years for a 'village
centered' one. Of course our present Social Unrest is about the uneven
use of people's resources but in the sense that the resource owners
thought by allowing the BTO (Big Time Operation) to use their land--SIPL,
Gold Ridge, Taiyo, Honiara itself--they were entering into some kind
of quid pro quo deal. We, the resource owners, allow you large companies
to use our most basic and precious resource--land, water, minerals.
etc--but in return we get good crack at the basics of a quality life--adequate
health facilities, solid education for our kids, an easier, more rewarding
village existence, some amenities and a shot at a future life which
is easier, better and certainly healthier than we now live.
What they got, however, was none of the above. Guale people, for instance,
experienced lousy schooling yet the nation's best schools sat right
on their doorstep . . . Honiara. Too many of their people continued
to suffer poor health, malaria was still a bugbear and the basics
of adequate health were often lacking yet down the road a bit at SIPL's
clinics, Honiara's referral hospital and satellite clinics, all on
Guale land, adequate health seemed to be for everyone except them.
Is it surprising then that in 1999 they said "Enough is enough!"?
By focusing on the Resource Issue and taking for granted or forgetting
what the Guale villager (and other Solomon Islander villagers) were
suffering will simply mean in a few years going through the same bloody
process once again. My thumbnail yardstick for producing the Better
Life is simple: would the development intervention make a woman's
life easier, more productive and healthier? If so, carry on. If not,
something has gone wrong.
Solomon Islanders to this day still struggle for the Better Life.
Opportunists nation-wide during the Social Unrest period jumped at
the chance by accessing resources--money--to achieve the Better Life.
Political opportunists secured government status to 'legitimately'
quarry the natural resources of the nation. Compensation claims often
played the same role for achieving the Better Life. Criminal elements
some within the police force itself criminalised the state also to
get the Better Life denied to them by what we would call the development
approach.
This present analysis contradicts little if anything stated in the
fine, balanced UN's Common Country Assessment of Solomon Islands.
However, it attempts to recast our discussions within the framework
of the villager and the village, the core reality of this small country.
This analysis focuses on how the UN and our other donors and friends
can help us to step forward, to frame our assistance to those who
have the greatest needs, have been least helped over the past 24 years
and, who, in fact, own an incredible amount of the nation's resource
base, up to 91%, which must be used by all for the Better Life for
all.
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Can
Solomon Islands Claim 21st Century?
By
Geoffrey Kaka
Solomon
Islands enters the 21st century with many of the world's poorest
countries. Incomes, assets, and access to essential services are
unequally distributed and the rural areas of the Solomons contains
a growing share of the world's absolute poor, who have little
power to influence the allocation of resources.
Moreover,
many development problems have become largely confined to Solomon
Islands. They include lagging primary and high school education
in rural areas, health services and other institutions.
Many countries have made important economic reforms, improving
macroeconomic management, liberalising markets and trade, and
widening the space for private sector activity. Where these reforms
have been sustained - and underpinned by civil peace - they have
raised growth and incomes and reduced poverty. Even as parts of
the pacific region are making headlines with ethnic tension and
natural disasters, other parts are making headway with rising
interest from domestic and foreign businesses and higher investment.
But
the response has not been sufficient to overcome years of falling
income or to reverse other adverse legacies from the long period
of economic decline - including deteriorated Solomon Islands capacity,
weakened institutions, and inadequate infrastructure. Major changes
are needed if Solomon Islanders - and their children - are to
claim the 21st century. With Solomon Islands rapidly growing population,
5 percent annual growth is needed simply to keep the number of
poor from rising.
Moreover,
Solomon Islands will not be able to sustain rapid growth without
investing in its people and in particular tertiary students both
at home and abroad. Many of our rural areas lack the health, education,
and access to inputs needed to contribute to - and benefit from
- high growth. Women are one of Solomon's hidden growth reserves,
providing some of the region's labour, but their productivity
is hampered by widespread inequality in education and access.
Thus gender equality can be a potent force for accelerated poverty
reduction.
Solomon Islands thus faces an immense, multifaceted development
challenge. But the new century offers a window of opportunity
to reverse the marginalisation of Solomon Island's people - and
of Solomon Island's governments, relative to donors, in the development
agenda. The time has come for political participation to sharply
increase, paving the way for more accountable government, and
there is greater consensus on the need to move away from the failed
models of the past. In my recent contribution on "Good Governance
for Solomon Islands" I have tried to emphasise how important
it is for Solomon Islands politician to play their part in the
development process.
All in all, making these benefits materialise will require a ``business
plan'' conceived and owned by Solomon Islanders, and supported
by donors through coordinated, longterm partnerships. Solomon
Islands culture differs widely, so there is no universal formula
for success. But many countries face similar issues, and can draw
on positive examples of how to address them.
Improving
governance and resolving conflict is perhaps the most basic requirement
for faster development. Widespread civil conflicts impose enormous
costs, including on neighbouring countries. Contrary to popular
belief, Solomon Island's conflicts donot stem from ethnic diversity
alone but rather, in a pattern found around the world, conflicts
are driven by poverty, underdevelopment, and lack of economic
diversification, as well as by political systems that marginalise
large parts of the population. But conflicts perpetuate poverty,
creating a vicious circle that can be reversed only through special
development efforts - including longrun peacebuilding and political
reforms. With success in these areas, countries can grow rapidly,
and flight capital can return.
Countries
that have made the greatest gains in political participation are
also those with better economic management. Again, this conforms
to a global pattern that suggests multiethnic states can grow
as fast as homogeneous ones - if they sustain participatory political
systems. Solomon Islands therefore, need to develop political
models that facilitate consensus building and include marginalised
groups.
Development
programs need to be winwin, improving the management and distribution
of economic resources and contributing to more effective states.
Programs should empower citizens to hold governments accountable,
enable governments to respond to new demands, and enforce compliance
with the economic and political rules of the game. Development
efforts may start to move in this direction, with greater beneficiary
involvement in the delivery of services and more emphasis on results.
But far more needs to be done to strengthen Solomon Island's institutions
- including ensuring that representative institution, such as
parliaments, play their proper role in economic and budgetary
oversight.
Investing
in people is also essential for accelerated poverty reduction
in Solomon Islands. Solomon Islanders are caught in a trap of
high fertility and mortality, low education (especially of women
- less than onequarter of poor rural girls attend primary school),
high dependency ratios, and low savings.
While
the resources available for education and health are inadequate
in Solomon Islands, many need to translate their existing commitment
to human development into effective programs for delivering essential
services and increasing gender equality. Solomon inherits some
of strongest communities in the Pacific, yet services are usually
provided through weak, centralised institutions that are seen
as remote and ineffective by those they are supposed to serve.
Deconcentrated service delivery through local communities, supported
by capacity building at local levels and effective governance
to ensure transparency and empower recipients, could have a major
impact. These could be done with effective regional cooperation
and donor support through coordinated long-term partnerships.
Increasing
competitiveness and diversifying economies must be a third area
of focus if Solomon Islands is to claim this new century. Job
creation is slow not because of labor market rigidities (though
there are exceptions) but because of the high perceived risks
and costs of doing business in Solomon Islands. These need to
be lowered by locking in reforms and delivering business services
more efficiently - with less corruption, better infrastructure
and financial services, and increased access to the information
economy. Solomon Islands trails the world on every dimension of
these essentials. Lowering these barriers requires new approaches,
including more participation by the private sector and by local
communities, a more regional approach to overcome the problems
posed by their rural communities, and a central government shift
to regulating and facilitating services rather than providing
them.
Reducing
aid dependence and strengthening partnerships will have to be
a fourth component of Solomon's development strategy. Concessional
assistance is essential if Solomon Islands is to grow rapidly
while also increasing consumption to reduce poverty. Excluding
private inflows, the savings gap for a typical country is about
17 percent of GDP, and other regions show that private flows cannot
be sustained at more than 5 percent of GDP without risk of crisis.
But aid, particularly when delivered in a weak institutional environment
by large numbers of donors with fragmented projects and requirements,
can weaken institutional capacity and undermine accountability.
High
debt and debt service add to the problem, deterring private investment
and absorbing core budget resources, making governments ever more
``cash poor'' but ``project rich,'' with a development agenda
increasingly perceived as being shaped by donors. Lack of selectivity
compounds the problem, channelling a lot of aid to countries with
poor development policies. And with few exceptions, aid has largely
been confined to national boundaries rather than used to stimulate
regional and international public goods.
These
problems should be widely recognised, and a consensus has emerged
that the primary goal of aid should be to reduce poverty. But
paradoxically, aid transfers are declining just when many of the
problems are being addressed. Solomon Islands enters the new century
in the midst of intense debate on aid. New aid relationships are
being implemented - relationships that emphasize a holistic, country-driven
approach supported by donors on the basis of long-term partnerships,
and with greater beneficiary participation and empowerment over
the use of resources.
If
there is going to be any change in the right direction for the
Solomon Islands, I believe there is a long way to go. In a typical
poor country like our Solomon Island, aid transfers might equal
10 percent of GDP, yet the poorest fifth of the population disposes
of only about 4 percent of GDP. It remains to be seen how well
partnerships can resolve the tensions between the objectives of
recipients and individual donors, and how far the behaviour of
donors will change to facilitate Solomon Islands ownership of
its development agenda. It also remains to be seen how far partnerships
can extend beyond assistance, to include enhanced opening of world
markets to Solomon Islands products and services.
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A Pacific
First: A Failed State!
By Dr. John Roughan
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Southern Africa
has seen many failed states: Sierra Leone, Uganda, Sudan and Congo
to name a few. Haiti, an island country off the southern part of
the United States, is another example. Argentina in South America,
if not yet a failed state, is hurriedly traveling in that same direction.
So far in the Pacific we have yet to experience a failed state but
Solomon Islands is fast sliding itself that way. It currently shows
many of the weaknesses of a failing state.
Lack of security for its citizens is one of the major signs of a
failed or failing state. Although we are only two months into a
new year, the country's security failures are severe. The recent
shoot-up of the police headquarters in Gizo town, a government minister
accused of extortion, daily acts of intimidation on business houses
and individuals, increasing number of home robberies, hijacked vehicles,
murder of police personnel . . . must I continue? Solomon Islands
lack of national security for its people guarantees it the dubious
distinction of being the Pacific's first failed state.
Another strong sign of a state in severe decline is its inability
to secure for its citizens normal schooling, basic medical attention
and a functioning economy to help people gain modest amounts of
money. The Solomons' inability to serve its people is years old.
Our national decline did not start with the 1999-2001 Social Unrest.
In fact, government's failure to serve its citizens is one of the
most important reasons for our current unrest. Solomon Islands governments
have been seriously failing their people since 1989.
SIDT's Report Cards (1992-1997) asked thousands of ordinary village
and town persons to grade government's performances in health services,
education opportunities, resource assistance and people's chances
of gaining money. Over the life of five different governments, Solomons'
people failed each government of the day. Not one government had
a 60% pass rate. In effect Solomons' people marked their last five
governments as failures. Lack of security and poor quality of state
services clearly mark the Solomons as a nation on its way out. The
Solomons is fast sliding down the failed-nations slope and, unfortunately,
has yet to land at the bottom.
What is disheartening, however, is that the Solomons in 1978 faced
a great future . . . in a sense we were doomed to success. We started
off so well--UK's $35 million golden handshake (at a time when the
Solomons' dollar and US were equal), villagers capable of feeding
a nation, no war damaged cities to re-build--and here we are ending
up the poorest nation in the Pacific. Most of our people live below
the poverty line, adult and youth unemployment is at a record high,
our economy continues its free fall, our dollar is useless overseas
and the people's loss of confidence in the political and social
institutions is at a record high.
Such a miserable end for such a blessed country shows up our leaders
special talent for destroying the country by lining their own deep
greedy pockets first. But the rest of the nation must look at ourselves
as well. So many of us thought the country's riches were inexhaustible--round
log exports in the 1990s--and we recklessly squandered this wealth.
Distrust of the state gradually grew into disrespect of the rule
of law, rampant small-time cheating, lying, theft gave the green
light for a few greedy 'leaders' to murder the state in the June
Coup.
But we must be clear about true meaning of the June 2000 Coup. The
destruction of the state was not something totally different from
what had been going on for many years during the late 1980s and
the early 1990s. The Coup was simply the public acceptance that
the State belonged to a political elite who could quarry it for
their personal benefit. Their well-thought out and planned destruction
of the State on 5 June 2000 was not some new kind of reality. It
was simply the continuation of the old politics of an elite stealing
the nation's resources for themselves. Unfortunately the 1990s pattern
and the true meaning of the Coup continue on to this very day.
Solomon Islanders continue to be fascinated by the rich country
it was instead of the poor country it has become. The ordinary citizen
must wake up to save the nation from those who are destroying it.
It's about action and not more 'betel nut chatter'. The next few
years, if we have that many, are critical. We must forget the burst
of round-tree fueled growth and the frenzied consumption which it
generated. Belt tightening especially among our leaders must be
the picture of the future. If not, then Solomon Islands will surely
go from sliding down the failed-nation slope to actually being a
failed nation.
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Honiara's
Well Being Starts in the Village!
By Dr. John Roughan
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In President Bush's early days, the United
States drew away from the rest of the world. According to President
Bush, his country was so strong--unbeatable military force, strongest
economy the world had ever seen, an inventive, dynamic and educated
people--that it could literally leave the rest of us mere mortals
to our own fate. The US would take care of itself in all ways. Then
came 11 September 2001. The Twin Towers destruction shook the States
to its roots and in turn literally changed the history of humanity
forever.
America finally woke up to the fact that it needed the rest of the
world as much as the rest of world needed it. Terrorists, they learned,
live best in small, poor and unstable nations. No matter how strong
the United States had become, terrorists proved more clever by using
America's own planes against them. The US's fleet of fighter aircraft,
thousands of them, proved useless to stop the terrorists. Slowly America
realised that its own well being depended not only on its huge military
machine, an overwhelming economy and a dynamic people, it fundamentally
needed other people, poor nations--Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia--for
its own safety. America painfully learnt a basics truth of history:
No country is an island!
Before ever a single bomb was dropped on Afghanistan, before the first
soldier landed on its soil, before a shot was fired, the Americans
forged new ties with Islamic nations across the globe, calmed the
fears of Israel, India and Afghanistan's neighbours and searched for
local and international support for the war. And it was highly successful.
Within 3 months, from a standing start, it toppled a government 7,000
miles away in the most difficult of terrain and caves, defeating tribes
that had beaten back the British and Soviet empires.
Fine you say, a nice piece of history but what does that say about
Honiara and the village? What lessons do we learn from the Afghanistan
war and apply them to our own case? Bear with me! I see serious lessons
which Honiara must learn about its relation to the village and the
villager.
Honiara especially its political elite have for years dismissed the
village and all it stands for. For starters it treated the rural areas
at best as places for hand outs, acts of charity and certainly little
to do with village as core to Honiara's well being. Not only is the
village and the villager the backbone of the country, it's economy
which literally sustains more than 8 out of 10 people nationally,
underpins our national cash economy. Honiara's cash economy needs
the village economy more than the other way around.
If Honiara's cash economy goes under (and it is well on its way: $1.3
billion debt, bone dry treasury, donor reluctance to help and outright
thievery), the village economy will continue, painfully, but it will
continue. Recall the Bougainville experience. PNG's military forces
blockaded the island for four years. Except for essential medicines
and doctors' care--there was no mass starvation, major epidemics,
food riots. Bougainvilleans' village economy sustained them through
nine years of war.
The Americans thought it would insulate itself from the world's troubles.
They were under the illusion if they could take care of themselves,
let the rest take care of itself and if it couldn't well that was
too bad. Honiara suffers that same soul-sickness.
Life in Honiara, many think, should be richer, healthier, nicer, more
stimulating and better and higher than any other place in the country.
So the investment dollar, development grant and donation wind up in
town. If a fraction of these monies help the villager, that's fine
but the main purpose has always been directed primarily towards making
Honiara lives easier, better and more enjoyable. And as in the American
case, we are paying the price for our lack of vision.
Our home-made Coup in 2000 should have been a national wake up call
but unfortunately we continue to slide down the same steep hill. Rather
than pulling together to convince donors that we have changed our
ways--better medical help in the village we can't even take care of
our Central Hospital--it's 'business as usual' . Our youth are bitter
and angry, yet our leaders act like spoiled pikininis and live the
message that intimidation, gun power and violence--terrorist acts--are
acceptable.
The Americans woke up to their blindness. We have yet to do so. Until
the village and the villager becomes part of our thinking--functioning
schools, decently stocked clinics, useable roads and wharves, a web
of local markets--then our own home-grown terrorists will continue
working their trade. Honiara's peace and prosperity depend upon a
strengthened quality of life for village people.
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Blame the
Victim!
By Dr. John Roughan
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A local newspaper,
Solomon Star (14 Jan. 2002), correctly focused readers attention
on the nation's growing poverty problem. However, the victims of
poverty, the vast bulk of our village and town people, are found
to be the major reason for causing all this poverty: they are having
too many children. Star rightly describes the growing national poverty
problem as serious but its editorial points to the wrong reason--"uncontrolled
population".
The nation's twenty-four years of suffering through weak political
leadership, their poor development policies and even the worse performance
of these leaders presents much clearer and convincing reasons why
the Solomons now suffers such serious poverty levels. Rather than
blaming the victims of poverty, the mothers and fathers of Solomons,
it would be much more productive to study the track record of those
who have poorly led our country into record poverty levels . . .
our political leaders.
Without any doubt growing population pressures contribute to poverty.
Our village and town folk realise the connection between the number
of children in a family and increased poverty levels. The main reason
why married couples produce children, however, is linked to old
age. For most parents, children act as an insurance policy for old
age. When hard times visit a family or when parents are too old
or sick to work the garden, repair their leaf house, or gather food
on the reef, etc. having family members--sons and daughters--assures
the 'Olos' they can still live out their old age in dignity and
respect.
In spite of the weakening cash economy since 1986, Solomon Islanders
had already begun to reduce their dependence upon having large families
as their basic insurance policy. The 1986 census figures placed
Solomons as one of the highest birth rates in the world . . . 3.4%.
In the 1999 census, however, Solomons people reversed that trend
and made a 22% decrease to 2.8%, still high by world standards but
definitely on the way down. Yes, search out for the clearest explanation
why our poverty rate is growing, but study our inept political leadership
over the last 24 years. Our population growth, already in decline,
is the least likely place to find the reason.
The early 1990s, for instance, gives more than enough examples of
the inept political leadership, their poor development policies
and lamentable performances to produce our current poverty levels.
In the Solomons it took a great deal of official planning, determination
and lack of vision to produce the poverty levels the nation now
suffers. For instance, during the Mamaloni era (1994-1997), more
than $109 million was squandered by giving massive duty remissions
to logging companies, both foreign and local. The same trend of
duty remissions continued in 2001 and even in the early days of
the present government.
The greatest single reason why poverty levels have grown over the
last 20 years, however, is traced to our leaders single development
focus: the Big Time Operation (BTO): Taiyo, SIPL, Gold Ridge and
in the pipeline, Western Province's oil palm (Vangunu) and a major
overseas port (Bina, Malaita). Village life has attracted some investment;
e.g. schools, clinics, water supplies, roads and other infrastructure.
However, governments over the past 20 years have made little effort
to insure that paid employment, social amenities, electrification,
etc. was part and parcel of village life.
Honiara drew in thousands of disaffected, bored and dispirited youths
from all parts of the nation. Honiara's Youth Disturbances (1989,
1993, 1995 and 1997) witnessed to the volatility of bored, jobless
and increasingly unruly youth. Rather than have these same youth--the
nation's healthiest, best educated and potentially the most productive--they
became the favorite recruiting grounds for the militants in 1999-2000.
Corruption at the highest levels of government coupled with poor
leadership patterns and flawed development priorities are the basic
reasons for Solomons current poverty levels. Little is gained nor
understanding helped by focusing on Solomon Islanders for having
large families, their only insurance policy they can actually fall
back upon.
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STATE
GOVERNMENT
THROWING OUR PEOPLE TO THE DEVILS
By Andrew GH Nori
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1. Introduction
I subscribe these views
at the threshold of the adoption of state or federal
system of government in Solomon Islands. With the coming into office
of the PAP/Independent alliance there will, undoubtedly, be a keen
push for full pledged federalism in our country. In addition to
the recommendations of the State Government Task Force (SGTF) they
now have the Townsville Peace Agreement as the green light to justify
their new initiatives on reactionary political adventurism.
Let me state at the outset
that since independence I have been a vocal advocate against the
big bang approach to federalism. Instead I have always
advised that we approach decentralization and autonomy through the
evolutionary process. This is reflected in the Provincial Government
White Paper produced and approved by Parliament in 1988.
My views on federalism
or on political development for that matter are influenced by the
belief that the survival of this country is based on economic discipline,
effective organisation and re-organisation of the factors of production,
hard-work and on a strong national leadership not on expanded
and power-loaded political structures, political debates, large
bureaucracies that accompany decentralization of political power
or having autonomous subgroups. Modern advocates of the so-called
state government are under the baseless and false illusion
that under the proposed system the states
will be able
to have some control over their natural resources
(Tuhaika,
Federal/State Government System and its impact on rural development
- 2001) and thereby, they conclude, improve their lot. The falsehood
in this statement is the assumption that control of
resources is the key to development and progress, instead of their
effective and sustainable utilization. Provincial or the proposed
state governments have not owned and will not own natural resources
in Solomon Islands, unless they proceed to legally acquire those
resources in accordance with law. All of us know that acquisition
of peoples resources by provinces has proved very difficult
in the past as opposed to acquisitions by the national government.
Resources in Solomon Islands will remain in the hands of the people,
not newly created political institutions or structures.
Control of resources
does not, in itself, bring about development. You have to marry
those resources with capital and manpower. But that is not all.
In order for the outcome of that economic formula to fully benefit
the populace you require a leadership that knows how to manage the
proceeds from economic activities to fully benefit the resource
owners. In other words we need, at the highest levels of our governance
system, a good sense of stewardship when it comes to using wealth.
This is an area which existing provincial leadership (which consists
of the same people who are pushing for autonomy) are very poor at,
similar to those at the national government level.
2. Current Constitutional
Arrangement
The views of the founders
of our constitution with regard to power sharing may be detected
from section 114 of the Constitution. That section (as amended)
neatly states:-
114. (1) Notwithstanding
anything contained in the Solomon Islands Independence Order 1978
Solomon Islands shall be divided into Honiara City and provinces.
(2) Parliament shall
by law-
(a) prescribe the
number of provinces, and the boundary of Honiara City and the provinces
after considering the advice of the Constituency Boundaries Commission;
(b) make provision
for the government of Honiara city and the provinces and consider
the role of traditional chiefs in the provinces.
For the purpose of this
discussion I wish to highlight the provision that requires Parliament
to make provision for the government
as
appearing in paragraph (2)(b) of section 114. These words carry
the following constitutional realities about Solomon Islands:
(1) Parliament, which
is established under section 46 of the constitution, consisting
of persons elected nationwide, is the custodian of the power to
govern in Solomon Islands;
(2) Solomon Islands is
united under the Constitution, giving rise to the concept of the
unitary state;
(3) Parliament is the
custodian of the Solomon Islands state; and
(4) Parliament is constitutionally
committed to ensuring that provinces have a form of government within
the unitary state, thereby allowing for our peoples participation
in the governance of their nation.
The duty of Parliament
stipulated in section 114 was performed in 1981 with the passage
of the Provincial Government Act (PGA). Despite what many critics
say about the 1981 PGA, it deserves some careful discussion in order
to bring out the real intention of that piece of legislation. I
wish to start that discussion under seven subheadings, namely:
(a) number of provinces
and their boundaries;
(b) political organisation within provinces;
(c) elections;
(d) power vesting;
(e) services;
(f) legislative functions;
(g) financial arrangements.
(1) Number of Provinces
and boundaries
The 1981 PGA established
seven provinces, namely Western, Isabel, Central, Malaita, Guadalcanal,
Makira & Ulawa and Temotu. The location and boundaries of these
provinces were the remnants of post-colonial arrangements, which
were wholly based on administrative convenience, considering transportation
and communication impediments of the time.
Three matters weighed
heavily on the minds of the government when it introduced the 1981
PGA (followed by six amendments and a repeal in 1996 and re-instatement
in 1997). These were that-
(a) sustainability of
the new provinces would depend on effective and continuing consultation
with the national government administration, especially on matters
of manpower sharing, resources allocation, accountability and transparency;
(b) the devolution process
envisaged under the Act requires regular negotiations and discussions
which could be better achieved if there were less number of provinces;
and
(c) since provincial
governments were expected, foremost, to carry out several key services
on behalf of the government regular or constant check on services
output was required, as well as ensuring that the level of services
did not drop below expected standards.
(2) Political Organisation
within Provinces
The political arrangements
within a province is a mirror of the national government system
in terms of structure at the top it has the assembly that
elects a premier as chief executive who then appoints his executive
members from within the assembly. This simple system may appear
flat and as a prototype of the national government arrangement but
it does have some unique features. These features are :-
(a) Multiple Ownership
Unlike the national government
where the right to own property is vested in specific bodies, eg,
commissioner of lands etc, at the provinces both the assembly and
the premier may hold property on behalf of the province. This gives
rise to the concept of multiple trusteeships. Section 29 of the
PGA (as amended) permits this where it states-
29.- (1) A devolution
order may provide that any property which-
(a) is held by or
on behalf of the Government, and
(b) appears o the
Minister to be property used or to be used solely or mainly for
a Provincial Assembly or for or in connection with the exercise
in a province of devolved functions,
shall be held by or
on behalf of the Provincial Assembly or, as the case may be, the
Premier of the province.
(b) Multiple employers
The PGA also allows for
the Premier, the executive or the Assembly to employ staff in their
own right (see section 29 (f)). The Speaker, too, may employ his
own staff with the consent of the assembly, in terms of number of
such employees (see section 24(2)). This ascribes to each of the
three bodies some degree of corporate status, unlike their counterparts
at the national level.
(c) Vesting of powers
The 1981 PGA does not
use the term power, instead it employs the term functions.
This was not simply the legal draftsmans choice of terminology.
In fact there is an ideological reason for the choice of language.
Provincial governments are to enjoy functional responsibilities,
not powers for political adventurism. This understanding may be
drawn from the very language and structure of PART III of the 1981
PGA. Responsibilities devolved to provincial governments are to
enhance the effective provision and supply of services and duties.
I wish to call this controlled devolution or checked
decentralization. It is the very essence of evolutionary local governance,
as opposed to the big bang approach that demands instant
empowerment.
The transfer of functions
from the Government to the premier or the assembly or the executive
is through a legal vehicle called devolution orders. These are simply
orders made by the minister that define and describe the functions
to be transferred. These orders are subject to affirmative resolutions
in Parliament, meaning that before they become effective, they have
to be approved by Parliament just like a Bill.
(3) Elections
Election is held every
four years to provincial assemblies at various times, depending
on the date the first election was held in each province. Registration
of voters is proceeded with in the same way it is done for national
parliament elections. In fact registration of voters is carried
out under the Provincial Government (Elections) Regulations that
are based on the Local Government (Elections) Regulations.
For election purposes
a province is divided into wards. These electoral units are demarcated
on both population and linguistic or dialectical bases, each with
a population ranging from three to five thousand on Malaita to just
a few hundreds in Rennell Bellona Province. These wards are the
smallest electoral constituents in Solomon Islands.
A member is elected for
a ward if he scores the highest ballot at an election, which on
many occasions, are not often the majority of votes.
By a latter amendment
to the 1981 PGA (No. 5 of 1986) a provision was made for appointment
of persons to the assembly. These are called appointed members and
are so appointed by the Assembly as a matter of discretion. Some
assemblies were known to have made use of this provision to appoint
traditional leaders or chiefs to the assemblies, perhaps in a lame
attempt to satisfy section 114(2) of the Constitution. Their problem,
of course, was that chiefs regarded those appointments as cosmetic
as they hardly reflected the chiefly structures of the various wards
and tribes in the province.
I have two issues to
raise over the provincial electoral process and the composition
of the assembly. These issues, I feel, are the causes of much frustration
and dissatisfaction in our rural communities. These are-
(a) Electoral Wards
When the 1981 PGA was
being conceived it was the general expectation of leaders in rural
communities that the new law would have allowed for an affective
linkage between the real community leaders and the national government.
They had hoped that real tribal leaders would then have the long-awaited
chance to take part in the political governance of the affairs of
the province and their nation. This hope was justified in all respects
not only in terms of leadership quality and respectability
but also in terms of accountability and representational legitimacy.
Many Solomon Islanders
relate to leadership structures that pre-exist those structures
and systems we adopt under our new laws, eg, parliament, cabinet,
assemblies, parliamentarians etc. These are newly manufactured institutions
that have no bearings at all with resources ownership and utilization,
community leadership and the day-to-day management of the masses.
The electoral wards and
the representation of those wards give no recognition or allowance
for pre-existing leadership institutions, such as tribal groups
and their internal leadership values and priorities.
In many of the coastal
villages throughout Solomon Islands eligible candidates have often
been persons who were not recognised as leaders in terms of resources
management and utilization. Most of them are visitors to the area
from other places or are church leaders with no tribal connection
in the wards. They are, so they say, rootless leaders, depending
only on state laws for their protection, elevation (as leaders)
and recognition. Culturally, they are without any recognisable foundations.
This is the biggest weakness in the representational system we develop
under the PGA regime - not the process of devolution involving transferring
functional responsibilities to provinces on gradual bases and by
negotiations.
I shall deal later with
how we could improve the system of representation in our country,
especially in terms of power sharing below Parliament.
(b) Executive leadership
The executive leadership
in a Province consists of the Premier and his executive members,
who were, until 1986, without any official titles. Executive members
are appointment by the Minister from amongst members of the assembly,
acting on the advice of the Premier.
The Premier is elected
by secret ballot by an absolute majority of votes of the assembly
members.
Again this system of
electing the provinces chief executive is a prototype of the
national government arrangement. Its main weakness lies in a conglomerate
of factors, namely-
(i) Lack of power base
Most often candidacy
for the post of premier is determined in last minute political manoeuvres
made a few days just before the premiers ballot is taken.
Like the national parliament, the absence of political parties at
provincial level and the apparent obscurity of candidates in terms
of provincial politics often lead to election of leaders who lack
any power base in the province.
(ii) Political Illiteracy
Most often persons who
get elected to the post of premier have very little knowledge of
the functions and duties expected of them under the provincial government
system. They often take office with the ambition of becoming mini
prime ministers with equal clout, respect and performance. Instead
of taking efforts to discharge their statutory and legal duties
as expected of them under the enabling legislation they, with others,
often spend most of their time squabbling about having more powers
and responsibilities. The reality is that there are adequate legislative
and statutory powers vested in provinces to carry out the various
functions devolved to them.
(iii) Leadership Discipline
Leadership discipline
is lacking at both the national and provincial levels. However,
its absence in provinces where leaders are closer to the eyes of
the people poses serious impediments on efforts to gain the trust
and confidence of the population. Governments are seen through the
quality of the people who man them. It is bad publicity for the
system to have someone as premier whose life borders on political
indiscipline, immorality, unethical behaviours and carelessness.
A major improvement to
provincial leadership may come if premiers were elected under a
provincial franchise rather than just by the assembly members.
(4) Service delivery
The 1981 PGA is premised
on the belief that governance is about effective and efficient service
delivery nothing less, nothing more. It recognises that the
national government administration is too far away in Honiara so
as to deliver services on time and at a level consistent with the
genuine needs of the recipients. For this reason the PGA develops
a principal/agent arrangement whereunder the province would act
as agents for the national government in the delivery of vital services.
A list of the services covered by this statutory agency is at Schedule
6 to the PGA. These are-
Trade and industry
Transport
Agriculture
Health
Welfare and other
social services
Housing
Information
Forestry
Education
Electricity
Tourism; and
Corporate or Statutory
Bodies.
In order to fully appreciate
the service delivery mechanism provided for under the PGA it is
important to understand the nature and extent of the services devolvable
or transferable under the Act.
First, the provision
of services is not a matter that requires new legislation by the
Province. Where a particular national law governs a service such
law will remain in force and will continue to regulate both the
quality and quantity of the services to be provided. Provinces are
only required to be the implementers of the services. They do not
legislate for those services.
Taking the first listed
service under Trade and Industry the Schedule states
Employment. Co-operatives. Local trades and industries.
In practice the effects of and scope of this provision are that
the Provincial Executive may-
(a) employ personnel
for the purpose of carrying out or furthering trade and industry
in Provinces, but the law to govern such employment will remain
the Employment Act, the Labour Act and other labour-related laws
enacted by Parliament, applicable and in force in Solomon Islands;
(b) Promote and encourage
the development of co-operatives,
local trade and industry
within the province, using personnel employed for that purpose.
Under the listed item
of Forestry the Province cannot issue license but certainly
may proceed to engage in forestry management and conservation. When
this provision is read with Schedule 4 paragraph 12 it is legally
permissible for provinces to engage in forestry harvesting and utilisation.
In the fields of health
and education the quality of services carried by provinces have
been pathetic, most often because they divert financial allocations
given by the National Government into areas which are either politically
lucrative or personally accessible.
In reality, therefore,
provinces should have been very busy houses when it comes to service
delivery to the populace - carrying out things that were intended
to improve the living standards and welfare of the people.
(5) Legislative Functions
Schedule 4 to the PGA
describes the various matters over which provincial assemblies may
legislate. These are-
Trade and industry
- Local licensing of professions, trades and businesses. Local marketing.
Cultural and Environmental
Matters
- Local crafts. Historical remains. Protection of wild creatures
Transport
- Coastal and lagoon shipping. Provision, maintenance and improvement
of harbours, roads and bridges,
Finance
-
Raising revenue by-
(1) Head tax
(2) Property tax
(3) Fees for services
performed or licensed issued by or on behalf of the Provincial Executive
(other than services performed or license issued by them as agent
for another); and
(4) Such other
means as may be approved for the purpose of this paragraph by the
Minister by order.
Agriculture and Fisheries
- Animal husbandry. Management of Agriculture land. Grants, loans
and subsidies in respect of agricultural production. Protection,
improvement and maintenance of fresh-water and reef-fisheries.
Land and Land Use
- Codification and amendment of existing customary law about land.
Registration of customary rights in respect of land including customary
fishing rights. Physical planning except within a local planning
area (within the meaning of the Town and Country Planning Act or
an area to which Part IV of that Act has been applied (development
areas).
Local Matters
- Fire services and fire protection. Waste disposal and cleansing
services. Rest houses. Eating houses and similar places. Public
conveniences. Vagrancy. Public nuisances. Cemeteries. Parks and
recreation grounds. Markets. Keeping of domestic animals. Building
standards.
Local Government
- The constitution, area and general powers and duties of Area Councils
and similar bodies, their revenue and expenditure.
- The making of bye-laws
by such bodies, that is, laws-
(1) Affecting only
the area of responsibility of the body;
(2) Not having
effect until confirmed by the Provincial Executive; and
(3) Not made for
the purpose for which provision is made by, or is or may be made
under, any other enactment.
- To determine by resolution
of the Provincial Assembly the salaries and allowances to be paid
in respect of area councillors.
Housing
- Housing. Regulation of rents.
Rivers and Water
- Control and use of river waters. Pollution of water. Provision
of water supplies (other than urban water supply, in areas prescribed
by the Minister under the Solomon Islands Water Authority Act).
Liquor
- Liquor licensing
Corporate or Statutory
Bodies
- Establishment of corporate or statutory bodies for the provision
of provincial services including economic activity.
I have listed these legislative
matters in order to highlight the volume of activities over which
existing provincial assemblies have powers to legislate. Provincial
governments are not just powerless institutions, lacking in any
form of autonomy. In a united country like Solomon Islands Parliament
can never be expected to grant full autonomy to provinces or states,
as this will be tantamount to independence, which is totally outside
federalism.
To press my point further
let us revisit Schedule 4 of the PGA and re-examine in detail the
assemblies actual legislative capacities. These powers may
be categorised into three main areas, namely, service, development
and finance. Under service we have matters for which an assembly
may legislate in order to enhance and maximise delivery of services.
Development matters are areas over which the assembly may legislate
to energise and promote development of new areas, whether they are
natural resources or improving the political structure to promote
effective development activities (which may also involve effective
service delivery). And finance issues are those that the assembly
may legislate on in order to generate income for the province to
assist in service delivery or in carrying out development activities.
Legislative
Powers of Provincial Assemblies in table form
|
Subject
|
Service
|
Development
|
Finance*
|
| Trade & Industry |
|
|
|
| |
Licensing
of professions |
Local
marketing |
Licensing of professions
Licensing of
trade |
| Cultural and Environmental
Matters |
Local crafts
Historical
remains
Protection
of wild creatures |
Local
crafts |
|
| Transport |
Coastal and lagoon
shipping |
Coastal and lagoon
shipping |
|
| |
Provision, maintenance
and improvement of harbours, roads and bridges |
Provision,
maintenance and improvement of harbours, roads and bridges |
|
| Finance |
|
|
Head tax
Property tax
Fees for services
Other means
as may be approved by he Minister@ |
| Agriculture and
Fishing |
Management of agricultural
land.
Protection,
improvement and maintenance of fresh-water and reef fisheries.
|
Animal husbandry
Management
of agricultural land
|
Grants, loans and
Subsidies in
respect of agricultural production#
|
| Land and Land Use |
|
Codification of
customary land law about land, registration of customary rights.
Physical planning. |
|
| Local Matters |
Fire services; fire
protection; waste disposal and cleansing services; eating houses;
public conveniences; vagrancy; public nuisances; cemeteries;
parks and recreational grounds; markets; keeping of domestic
animals. |
Rest houses, eating
houses; Building standards
|
|
| Local
Government |
|
Constitution
of Area Councils |
Making laws for
revenues of Area Councils |
| Housing |
|
Housing |
Regulation of rents |
| Rivers
and Water |
Control
and use of river waters; Pollution of water |
Provision
of water supplies |
Provision of water
supplies (levying consumption charges for it) |
| Liquor |
Liquor licensing |
|
Liquor licensing |
| Corporate
bodies |
|
Establishment of
corporate and statutory bodies for provision of services and
investment |
Establishment
of corporate bodies for investment purposes |
This is the full extent
of the legislative functions vested in provincial assemblies. The
question is, are they adequate for provincial needs? Let us look
at some of the areas listed in the table and analyse their practical
scopes:
(a) Trade and Industry
Under this subject provinces
are empowered to control business activities by licensing. They
also regulate markets in the same way. This may appear to be a minor
area of legislative competence but it is one under which provinces
may generate much revenue if they adopt more open and pre-emptive
policies. Instead, to-date, many provincial leaders have been using
this legislative mechanism to exclude worthwhile business activities
by imposing exorbitant fees and refusing others to invest in their
provinces.
A soundly regulated licensing
regime in provinces could be a vital opener to investment.
(b) Cultural and Environmental
Matters
The power vested in provinces
under this subject is targeted at promoting cultural awareness and
at the protection of local fauna an essential component in
development.
(c) Transport and lagoon
shipping
Under this heading provinces
should have made laws to regulate safety of coastal and lagoon shipping,
which could include provisions for passenger safety and quality
of shipping services.
(d) Finance
Provinces are permitted
to enact laws to raise revenue by head tax, property tax, fees and
SUCH OTHER MEANS as may be approved by the Minister by order.
Why the PGA worded this
particular provision the way it did I am not sure. However, from
provincial perspective, it virtually gives the provinces unrestricted
avenue through which it could negotiate with the Minister for more
unlimited revenue raising powers.
Property tax
as used under this section is not restricted to registered land
located in urban or semi-urban centres as has been the case up to
now. The province could have used this power to enact legislation
to raise property tax from other forms of assets. My suggestion
is that they should do away with the head tax and raise revenue
from property. This will force property owners to utilize their
assets more efficiently and effectively.
Also using the same provision
provinces could have asked the Minister to empower them to raise
revenue from road and lagoon traffic, fuel consumption, services
levies at wharves and selected public utilities.
(e) Management of Agricultural
Land
This is where provincial
assemblies should have enacted laws to govern how we should deal
with land, relative to the impact of cash-cropping on available
land resources; use of land to prevent erosion and ensuring that
activities not conducive to proper land use, such as logging, are
not allowed within certain areas of agricultural land.
Under this head, too,
assemblies should have declared, by law, existing agricultural
opportunity areas (AOAs) identified in provinces
as agricultural land.
This head also permits
provinces to issue grants, loans and subsidies in respect of agricultural
production. This power alone should have revolutionalised provincial
development to a large scale. No provinces, through ignorance of
this vested power, ever conceived and invoked the idea of establishing
in provinces a separate agricultural loans and grant schemes which
could have been managed jointly by the Development Bank of Solomon
Islands. No credit schemes were ever set-up, leaving farmers to
vent for themselves. What we could have done was to declare the
AOAs as agricultural land, set-up credit schemes and target
our financing at these AOAs. Agricultural production would have
increased allowing our people to increase their income levels and
thereby improving their standards of living. None was ever thought
of by our provincial leaders.
(f) Land and Land Use
The devolution of land
and land use to provincial assemblies is one of the backbones of
our decentralization regime. If fully realised, it would have been
the springboard for land reform, enhanced rural development and
community progress.
Looking at the recent
so-called bona fide demands of the people of Guadalcanal,
this is what the Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly should have used.
Instead it was demanding the Government to amend the Land &
Titles Act, which only covers 8% of arable land on Guadalcanal.
Provinces have had this legislative gold mine since 1981 and they
failed to use it to their peoples advantage.
Under this specific power
our provincial assemblies should have carried out comprehensive
surveys and research on the state and commonalities of practices
and rules applicable to customary land rights and usage. They should
then have proceeded to codify those common rules and have them enacted
as ordinances by assemblies. By doing this we will develop our common
law on c | |